Big government and your Big Mac by Chudler, Nadav David
Master’s thesis · 30 hec · Advanced level  
Europan Erasmus Mundus Master Program: Agricutural Food and Enviornmental 
Policy Analysis (AFEPA)   
Degree thesis No 1045 · ISSN 1401-4084 
Uppsala 2016 
iiii 
Big Government and your Big Mac 
Analyzing the Impact of Corn and Soybean Subsidies on US 
Meat Markets 
Nadav David Chudler  
  
 
 
iiii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Big Government and your Big Mac 
Analyzing the Impact of Corn and Soybean Subsidies on US Meat Markets 
 
Nadav David Chudler 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Hans Andersson 
 Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
 Department of Economics 
 
Assistant supervisor: Professor Thomas Heckelei 
 University of Bonn 
 Department of Economics 
 
Examiner: Professor Sebastian Hess 
 Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
 Department of Economics 
 
 
Credits:  30 hec 
Level: A2E 
Course title: Independent Project/Degree Project in Economics 
Course code: EX0537 
Programme/Education: European Erasmus Mundus Master Program: Agricultural Food 
and Environmental Policy Analysis (AFEPA) 
Faculty: Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences 
 
Place of publication: Uppsala 
Year of publication: 2016 
Name of Series: Degree project/SLU, Department of Economics 
No: 1045 
ISSN 1401-4084 
Online publication: http://stud.epsilon.slu.se 
 
Keywords: feed crops, insurance premium subsidies, meat production externalities 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Personal Declaration 
 
I hereby affirm that I have prepared the present paper self-dependently, and without the use of 
any other tools, than the ones indicated. All parts of the text, having been taken over verbatim or 
analogously from published or not published scripts, are indicated as such. The thesis hasn’t yet 
been submitted in the same or similar form, or in extracts within the context of another 
examination.  
 
 
 
_______________________________               ___________________________ 
Place and date of submission                               Student’s Signature   
  
 
 
 
Big Government and your Big Mac: Analyzing the Impact 
of Corn and Soybean Subsidies on US Meat Markets 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented to 
The Faculty of Economics at 
The Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
of Masters of Science 
 
 
by 
 
Nadav David Chudler 
 
September, 2, 2015 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 
Nadav David Chudler 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
  
 
 
 
Nadav David Chudler 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________  
 Professor Hans Andersson, Thesis Advisor 
  Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
  
 ________________________________________________ 
 Professor Thomas Heckelei, 2. Thesis Committee Member 
  University of Bonn 
 
__________________________________________________ 
 Professor Sebastian Hess, 3. Thesis Committee Member 
  Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
Extensive literature exists regarding the externalities of industrial meat production in the 
United States. There is also a belief that the growth of these production systems were facilitated 
by high levels of subsidies for corn and soybean, the primary crops, or byproducts of which are 
used to feed livestock. This in turn suggests a linkage between feed crop subsidies and the 
externalities from meat production. Regardless of any impact these subsidies may have had on 
development of industrial meat production the only subsidies currently of relevance for corn and 
soybean are for insurance rate premiums. This paper proposes to examine the impact of these 
subsidies on the US meat markets using a modified stochastic equilibrium displacement model 
originally developed by Dhoubhadel, Azzam, and Stockton. The results found that these 
subsidies have a minimal effect on meat production levels. Therefore, if a reduced meat sector is 
desirable then other avenues, such as improved regulation or taxation, should be pursued. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
A myriad of research exists and continues to be published regarding the negative 
externalities of industrial meat production, which range from human health impacts, 
environmental degradation, and socioeconomic performance in communities near such 
operations (Daley, et al., 2010; Nguyen, Hermansen, & Mogensen, 2010, 2012; Scollan et al., 
2010; Sneeringer, 2009; Walker et al., 2005;  Osterberg & Wallinga, 2004; Kanaly et al., 2010; 
ISU/UISG, 2002) Reducing meat production would decrease the prevalence of these 
externalities, yet it has continued to rise over the past few decades (USDA Economic Research 
Service). This continues despite increased awareness of these problems. 
There is a story become popular in the United States from Michael Pollan’s book, The 
Omnivore’s Dilemma, where he describes how the growth of the industrialized meat sector was 
aided by the drastic transformation of US agricultural policies beginning in the early 1970s 
(2006). During this period the federal government began the process of dismantling the New 
Deal farm programs of the 1930s. Government subsidies began to incentivize farmers to produce 
as much corn and soybean as possible1, which are the primary crops (or the byproducts of which) 
used to feed cattle, hogs, and poultry. Propped by these subsidies, farmers began to rapidly 
expand corn and soybean even as their market prices continued falling. This influx of cheap corn 
and soybean encouraged the growth of large scale animal farms, in which feed took an 
increasingly large share of total costs. However, this is not an examination of how the history of 
subsidies affected the development of meat production, but what influence they currently have. 
Even if the historical account by Pollan is accurate2 and that the meat industry captures part of 
the subsidy rent (Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 2006, p. 28), it does not mean that industrial meat 
production is still dependent on these subsidies.  
One should be aware that the subsidies Pollan talks about in his book, such as price 
support and direct payments, have been mostly eliminated in the United States. The salient 
                                                 
1 Soybean did not begin receiving significant levels of subsidies until much later. However, soybean has been the 
typical crop used in rotation with corn fields. Hence, increasing corn acreage would result in increased soybean 
production as well. 
2 The author wishes to emphasize that no specific claim is made here regarding the role corn and subsidies have 
played in the development of industrial meat production. 
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program in the 2014 US Farm Bill for corn and soybean is the insurance rate premium subsidies, 
which are based on historical acreage and yields (World Trade Organization). Of these programs 
farmers receive subsidies specifically on the premium rates of the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program (FCIP). It is these subsidies that are the primary focus of this paper. Specifically, this 
paper will examine the indirect impact insurance premium subsidies have on meat markets 
through their effects on livestock feed supply.  
While consumers have benefited from an increased supply of cheap meat to the point of 
being the largest per capita consumers of meat during the 20th century (Warman, 2003), there are 
multiple externalities associated with industrial meat production that government regulation has 
so far failed to internalize with significant costs to society (Osterberg & Wallinga, 2004). 
Therefore the author asserts the importance of examining policies that could potentially reduce 
the scale and scope of industrial meat production in the United States. 
The objective of this paper is to quantify the impact a reduction in insurance premium 
subsidies for corn and soybean would have on meat and ethanol markets in the United States. 
This will be addressed by using a modified stochastic equilibrium displacement (SEDM) model 
originally used by Dhoubhadel, Azzam, & Stockton (2015), who analyzed the impact of a 
drought on US grain, livestock and ethanol markets. While this paper will later discuss in more 
depth the details of this model and the changes made to it, it is noted now that insurance rate 
premium subsidies for corn and soybean were introduced as the exogenous variables to be 
shocked. The following conceptual framework clarifies the connections between the various 
sectors and policies (See Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1. Conceptual framework of model 
 
Author’s own depiction 
 
The diagram above is useful to illustrate the relationships between key government 
policies and the various actors in the beef and ethanol commodity chains. The blue arrows 
represent flows of either policies or products from and to the different actors. The boxes 
represent either the actors and stages involved in the commodity chains or the products and 
policies produced by them. Products and policies are connected to the blue arrows indicating to 
which level of each commodity chain they are sold to (products) or have their impact on 
(policies). The colors depict the stages of each commodity chain and the commodities 
themselves, beginning with government and government policies in orange, the retail and export 
markets in green3, and the actors in between with their products are in red and purple, 
respectively. One point that requires clarification is that depending on the meat sector being 
analyzed, the farm, industrial livestock operation4, and meat processors will consist of one, two, 
                                                 
3 For clarity in the graph, no arrows were drawn toward exports, but the model allows for exports of all commodities 
except for ethanol. Also the backgrounding phase of beef production has been omitted to reduce clutter. This would 
simply be a flow of cattle to the feedlot operators, denoted as CAFO (see footnote 4).  
4 The term CAFO (Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation) is used instead of industrial livestock operation for 
space consideration. 
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or three stages for the poultry, pork, and beef sectors, respectively, due to the level of integration 
in the industry. 
The explanation of the diagram will progress from the top-down beginning with 
government and first covering the ethanol commodity chain. Here the Renewable Fuels 
Standard5 (RFS2) mandates blenders to use a minimum amount of ethanol when blending fuel, 
which is sold to retail markets. This creates an inelastic source of demand for distillers, who use 
corn to produce ethanol and sell DDGS as a coproduct of the distillation process to the livestock 
sector.  
The government subsidizes insurance premiums for corn and soybean which incentivizes 
farmers to grow more of those crops than they otherwise would. While much of the corn is sold 
to ethanol distillers, a significant amount is also sold to the livestock sector, as is soybean in 
meal form. Both are also exported abroad. Livestock is then sold to the meat processors, who 
then either supply meat to the retail sector or export it. 
What the author expects to occur given a reduction in subsidies is as follows. Initially 
there would be a downward supply shift of corn, soybean, and soybean meal. Since corn demand 
from the ethanol sector is inelastic due to the RFS2 mandate, corn prices are likely to be even 
more impacted than soybean prices. Livestock producers will shift some of their consumption of 
corn and soybean meal to distiller’s grains, with cattle raisers experiencing the biggest shift in 
consumption patterns due to the ability of cattle to consume more DDGS than hogs or poultry. 
Meanwhile, we would expect exports of all three feeds and soybean to decline, due to the higher 
elasticity of export demand than the domestic market. One would expect the quantity of meat and 
livestock at all levels to decrease while prices increase. The one exception may be the market for 
feeder cattle, the production of which uses pasture instead of feed crops. This sector is instead 
assumed to experience a negative demand shift from the feedlot level, which results in both a 
price and quantity decrease.  
The hypothesis for the research objective is as follows:  Regardless of any influence corn 
and soybean subsidies may have had on shaping present day industrial livestock operations, the 
author assumes that these sectors have grown to the point where they no longer depend indirectly 
on these subsidies. This point is supported by recent experience. The average real price of corn 
                                                 
55 The RFS2 mandate and its implications are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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and soybean from 2008-2013 nearly doubled the average from 2002-2007 (farmdoc), yet the 
production of beef, pork, and poultry all increased during period6 (USDA Economics Research 
Service). The author suggests industrial livestock operations simply benefit from the policy by 
capturing part of the subsidy rent. It is assumed that any changes to the equilibrium prices and 
quantities of the meat sectors will be very small relative to the changes in the feed grain markets 
following a reduction in insurance premium subsidy payments.  
Moreover, when discussing the impact of subsidies on US meat markets it is important to 
take market power into account. These commodity chains are highly concentrated at the packing 
and retail levels (Azzam & Anderson, 1996; RTI International, 2007; Weng, 2012; Wise & Trist, 
2010). Starmer, Witteman & Wise argued that this difference in market power has allowed the 
meat industry to capture significant rent from corn and soybean subsidies (2006). Therefore, 
while providing a background of the different markets in the model, the next chapter will also 
provide an overview of the role of market power within them. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 offers a background of US 
agriculture policy, the commodity chains in the model, and a brief overview of the externalities 
associated with industrial meat production. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the relevant literature 
relevant to this research question and EDMs in general. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology 
employed to answer the research question. Chapter 5 presents the results from the simulation, 
and Chapter 6 concludes with the main findings of this research. 
  
                                                 
6 The author notes that from 2010 to 2014 there has been an 8% beef production. 
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Chapter 2 - Overview of Markets and Externalities 
 2.1 Agriculture Policy 
This section is divided into two parts, the first of which provides an overview of the 
history of US agriculture policy as it relates to corn and soybean up to present policy. An 
understanding of these policies and their impacts will assist the reader in understanding how 
insurance subsidies for corn and soybean farmers affect meat markets as well as how US 
agriculture has become increasingly focused on insurance programs. The second part will 
specifically examine the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) with an accompanying analysis 
of how these subsidies may be affecting production levels. 
 2.1.1 History of Agriculture Policy 
The modern era of US agriculture policy began during the Great Depression under 
Roosevelt with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Warman (2003) argued that until then 
there had been a history of ineffective government interventions. The key aim of these programs 
was to influence agricultural markets by affecting supply.  The most important policies for 
achieving these goals were set-aside programs, acreage reduction and the creation of the US 
Granary. The first two directly reduced the amount of crops a farmer could produce whereas the 
latter utilized subsidies to moderate farm price volatility by buying and storing program crops 
from farmers during seasons of ample harvest and low prices, and selling those stocks in years of 
poor harvest and high prices (Pollan, 2006; Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 2006; Warman, 2003).  
These policies were intended to provide a more predictable market for producers. In 
tandem with a set of other government policies including irrigation projects, roads, power 
networks and soil conservation programs, agriculture policy was instrumental in supporting 
agricultural production. Warman goes so far as to argue that the combination of these subsidies, 
price support programs, and infrastructural investments were more important in increasing 
farmer productivity than technological improvements such as hybrid crops and fertilizers (2006, 
pp. 186-187).  
The government began to dismantle this system of agricultural support beginning in the 
1960s, a process that culminated with the 1996 Farm Act. With the 1965 Food and Agricultural 
Act, the government started the process of removing supply constraints from farmers by 
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introducing the target pricing system. When the market price fell below the government set 
target price farmers received a direct subsidy payment to make up the difference (Marlow, 2005). 
The next significant policy shift occurred with the 1985 Food Security Act with the 
transformation of the Marketing Loan program. This program was originally introduced to allow 
farmers to take out loans at the government set loan rate and sell their crops later when prices 
were higher, thereafter paying off the loan. If prices remained below the loan rate then farmers 
had to pay a fixed portion of the original loan, which essentially serving as a price floor for their 
crops. The 1985 act removed the fixedness of the repayment rate, allowing it to decrease as 
world market prices decreased (Marlow, 2005). This act also introduced the Loan Deficiency 
Payment, which allowed farmers to take a payment of the loan rate minus the repayment rate 
instead of taking the loan. One of the main goals of this act was to reduce stockpiles and increase 
commodity exports (Glaser 1986, p. 8). With this policy the government essentially divested 
from itself the power to regulate agricultural market prices (Marlow, 2005). 
The government’s final departure from direct market price interference came about with 
the 1996 Farm Act. In a period of increasing prices and rising domestic and export demand, the 
law removed set-aside requirements thereby increasing the land available for productive 
purposes. Coupled with this, the law eliminated some planting restrictions, which allowed 
farmers to plant soybean on up to 15% of base acres allocated to other crops without affecting 
their bases or program payments (Ash, Livezey, & Dohlman, 2006). The act also introduced the 
Production Flexibility Contract payments, which were decoupled from current production and 
decreased over time. The plan was to gradually wean farmers off government support (Dmitri, 
Effland, & Conklin, 2005) and acclimate them to making their production decisions based on 
market signals (Marlow, 2005). 
However the 1997 Asian financial crisis and resulting crash in export demand pushed US 
farmers into a deep crisis, requiring emergency measures from the government (Starmer, 
Witteman, & Wise, 2006). The implementation of the Counter-Cyclical Payment and Direct 
Payment programs manifested radical increases in government payouts to farmers. The former 
program was coupled to prices but was based on historical acreage, whereas the latter was a 
decoupled flat payment per land unit owned (USDA ERS). Instead of weaning farmers from 
government subsidies, the result of the 1996 Farm Act was a dramatic increase in payments. In 
the 9 years from 1998-2006 corn subsidies were US$5 billion or higher in 6 of those years, and 
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totaled to more than US$10 billion in 2005. In the three years prior to 2008 soybean subsidies 
averaged approximately US$145 thousand. In 7 of the 9 years that followed, subsidies reached 
over US$1 billion, peaking at nearly US$5 billion in 2004 (Environmental Working Group). It 
should seem intuitive that subsidies on this scale regardless of degree of decoupling should have 
some effect on markets. Using subsidy data from the Environmental Working Group, historical 
production from the USDA Economic Research Service, and historical market price data from 
farmdoc, Figure 2.1 shows the amount of subsidy farmers received per bushel as a percentage of 
the market price. 
 
Figure 2.1. Corn and soybean subsidies as % of market price7 
 
  Adapted from: (Environmental Watch Group; farmdoc.illinois.edu; USDA ERS) 
 
While the recent trend has been that subsidies have been a small percentage of market 
prices, it is clear that in some years corn and soybean farmers received a significant part of their 
income from subsidies. From 1998 to 2006, corn farmers received at least 20% of their income 
from subsidies 6 times, peaking at over 45% in 2005. While less than corn, soybean also 
benefited greatly from subsidies in select years. This graph demonstrates what Starmer, 
Witteman, & Wise (2006) refer to as a paradoxical state in which, “U.S. farm policy maintains 
the semblance of free-market orientation by ostensibly keeping most payments decoupled from 
                                                 
7 Unless otherwise specified all dollar figures are in real terms. Nominal figures were converted using the CPI chart 
from inflationdata.com. All values are chained to the 1983-1985 average price level. 
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production, and by allowing farmers greater planting flexibility. At the same time, however, it 
maintains high taxpayer transfers to farmers (p. 9).” They go on to estimate the costs of corn and 
soybean production from 1986 to 2005 and found that between 1986 and 1996 corn and soybean 
were sold on average 17%  and 5% below the estimated costs of production. In the period after 
the 1996 Farm Act (1997 to 2005), these margins increased to 23% and 15% for corn and 
soybean respectively (Ibid. p. 28). This is clearly an indirect subsidy for meat producers using 
these crops and their byproducts to feed their livestock.  
As stated earlier in the introduction, the direct and counter-cyclical payments were 
eliminated and replaced with the Price Loss Coverage and Agriculture Risk Coverage programs 
in the 2014 Farm Bill (WTO 2014). These new programs cover shallow losses on yields or 
revenues not covered by the federal crop insurance program (O'Donoghue, 2014). Unfortunately, 
at the time of this writing, the author was unable to find any research on these programs other 
than brief descriptions of how they function. Therefore the only part of agriculture insurance to 
be discussed in the next section is the FCIP itself.  
 2.1.2 Federal Crop Insurance Crop Insurance 
 Overview 
The FCIP was founded in 1938 and is administered by the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC). Originally the FCIC was responsible for charging farmers an actuarially fair 
premium, which means that total premiums should cover expected total indemnities, and the 
government funded the administration and organization of the program. (Pearcy & Smith, 2013).  
The FCIP is a government subsidized and regulated insurance scheme, but the actual insurers are 
private companies. Producers choose whether to insure revenue or yields, and receive a payment 
when they fall below specified thresholds. Coverage levels begin from catastrophic risk coverage 
(50% of expected yield/revenue) to up 75% or 85%, depending on specific cases (OECD, 2008, 
p.53). These payments are decoupled from production, as they are derived from historical base 
acres and yields, which most often based on their 1998-2001 production levels (Olson, 2014). 
The government completely subsidizes the premium for catastrophic risk coverage, after 
which producers pay a portion of the premium price for higher levels of coverage. The amount of 
premium the government subsidizes ranges from 100% to 38% (Shields, 2015, p.11). The 
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government subsidizes premium rates at an average of 62% over the past few years (Glauber, 
2013)8.  
The US Government began to enhance the role of the FCIP with the 1994 Crop Insurance 
Reform Act, which is reflected in the overall growth of the program. Since the 1990s there has 
been rapid growth in total subsidies paid, acres and crops covered, liabilities and indemnities 
(See Figures 2.2 and 2.3) (Sumner & Zulauf, 2012). Despite the relative stabilization of acres 
covered by insurance in the past decade, liabilities have continued to grow as crop prices 
increase and farmers choose higher coverage levels. In 1995, “nearly all insured acres were at 65 
percent or lower coverage, but by 2011 about 75 percent of insured acres were at 75 percent or 
higher coverage” (Sumner & Zulauf, 2012, pp. 2-3). It is clear that the FCIP is a central 
component of current farm policy. 
 
Figure 2.2. The growth of the FCIP - Subsidies and Acreage9 
 
Adapted from (US Risk Management Agency) 
 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that there are other subsidies under the program including those provided to the insurance 
companies covering costs of administration and operation, as well as any indemnities above the premium received 
(OECD, 2008, p.53). However, this is not an issue of concern for this paper. 
9 Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 are shown in nominal dollar figures. 
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Figure 2.3. The growth of the FCIP - Liabilities 
 
Adapted from (US Risk Management Agency) 
Corn and soybean have historically been two of the greatest beneficiaries of the FCIP. 
Along with wheat, they make up approximately 2/3 of the total land area covered by insurance. 
From 1990 to 2012 the total area of corn and soybean under the FCIP has increased from 26 and 
17 million acres to 81 and 65 million, respectively. As a percentage of total land planted for each 
crop, the increases were from 35% and 29% to 84% for both crops (O’Donaghue, 2014, p. 4). By 
2014 the percentage increased to 87% for Corn and 88% for soybean. Combined they made up 
more than half of all the land covered by the FCIP (Shields, 2015, p. 4). Figure 2.4 demonstrates 
this rapid growth. 
 
Figure 2.4. Growth of corn and soybean coverage in the FCIP 
 
Adapted from (US Risk Management Agency) 
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Unfortunately the authors could only find program data for specific crops beginning from 
2003. However one can still see that the amount of subsidies increased by more than 3 times for 
both crops in just 12 years. Total liabilities increased at similar rates (US Risk Management 
Agency). The importance of the support provided FCIP and its subsidies to corn and soybean 
farmers should be apparent, especially when one takes into account that the Counter-Cyclical and 
Direct Payment programs were eliminated with the most recent farm bill. 
 Supply response to insurance and premium subsidies 
This section will attempt to convey the distortionary impact of insurance rate premium 
subsidies to the reader. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of research on this subject (Goodwin, 
Vandemeer, & Deal, 2003; Goodwin & Smith, 2013; Yu, 2015), but it is possible to qualitatively 
analyze the impact of subsidies into account when considering the literature on crop insurance 
and general risk theory simultaneously. 
Before examining previous studies and theory there is one important issue to take into 
account regarding the crop insurance policy. Congress has ordered the Risk Management 
Agency, the government organization overseeing the FCIP, to set premium rates so that expected 
indemnities exceed total premiums by 7.5%, but this relates to pre-subsidy premiums (Babcock, 
Hart, & Hayes, 2004, p. 563). The reader should recall that on average the government has 
subsidized 60% of total premiums. This means that the true loss-ratio, or the ratio of indemnities 
to premiums, is much higher than 1.075 mandated by Congress. This is effectively a transfer of 
wealth from taxpayers to farmers (Goodwin, & Smith, 2013). We can see this in Figures 2.5 and 
2.6 which show the net indemnity for corn and soybean farmers as well as the true loss ratio10. It 
is clear that in most years the difference between actual premiums paid and indemnities received 
resulted in a significant wealth transfer to farmers. For example, in 2012 the net indemnity paid 
to corn farmers totaled over US10 billion. 
                                                 
10 When the true loss ratio is equal to 1 then total premiums – subsidies = total indemnities. 
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Figure 2.5. Net indemnity and true loss ratio 
of corn 
 
Adapted from (US Risk Management Agency) 
 
Figure 2.6. Net indemnity and true loss ratio 
of soybean 
 
Adapted from (US Risk Management Agency) 
 
Sumner & Zulauf discuss three primary channels by which crop insurance can affect 
production levels (2012, p.10).The first is that the combination of crop insurance reimbursing 
farmer losses and subsidized premiums decreasing farmer costs increase expected farmer income 
per acre. Economic theory suggests that higher expected profits will incentivize farmers to 
produce more of the crops receiving subsidies.  The authors argue that, "it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that subsidized insurance premiums will have effects similar to that of a price 
subsidy" (p. 10). The second channel is via risk mitigation provided by crop insurance for 
producing on marginal lands, since poor harvests will be compensated. Thus, the potential losses 
may be significantly reduced. This can result in unused land or land used for other crops to be 
switched over to production of the insured commodity. The third avenue considers the overall 
reduction of risk faced by the farmer, who may therefore be incentivized to undergo riskier 
behavior focusing more on increasing productivity. When producers are exposed to potential 
losses they are more likely to utilize risk-mitigating practices that can decrease potential output 
in exchange for a reduction of potential losses. (Ibid). 
There are several studies that have examined the production effects of crop insurance, 
though not all took subsidies into account (Wu, 1999; LaFrance, Shimshack, & Wu, 2001; 
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Young, Vandeveer, & Schnepf, 2001; Goodwin, Vandeveer, & Deal, 2004; Goodwin & Smith, 
2013). All found positive albeit small effects of the provision of crop insurance on production 
levels. However there are multiple reasons that can explain the limited results. Sumner & Zulauf 
argue that crop expansion is limited by rotational concerns and lack of available land for 
extending production area. They also assert that the production impacts of insurance on one crop 
are diminished due to the fact that most crops are now eligible for the insurance program. Finally 
they note the fact that most studies occurred before the 2008 expansion of the crop insurance 
program (2012, p.11). This last point has become especially relevant now that crop insurance is 
the only program left for corn and soybean farmers. 
One more important aspect of the crop insurance program is the role of base updating. As 
mentioned previously, the historical averages from which average yields and acreage are 
typically based are from 1998-2001. The intention is to decouple payments from current 
production levels. However with the 2014 Farm Bill, farmers are allowed to update their base 
acreage and yields to the 2008-2012 averages (Olson, 2014). While this alone may not affect the 
decoupling effect of using historical production levels, farmer anticipation of further base 
updating in future farm bills can increase the distorting impact of these subsidies (Anton & le 
Mouel, 2002, p. 2). In other words, expectations of future base updating allowances may 
incentivize farmers to increase production now to increase their subsidy payments in later 
periods. 
At this juncture it would be useful to graphically analyze the impact of insurance 
premium subsidies using a simple production under risk model (Figure 2.7). In this model we 
assume farmers are risk averse. The supply function, S is the sum of the marginal cost of 
production, C`, and the marginal risk premium, R`, or the farmer’s marginal willingness to pay to 
avoid risk. If the farmer was risk neutral the supply curve would be equal to the marginal cost. 
The farmer produces at the output level where the expected price is equal to the supply function. 
Note that this output level is smaller than if the farmer produced where expected price is equal to 
marginal cost. 
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Figure 2.7. Production under risk - General framework 
 
Source: Finger, 2014. 
 
Following Yu we can imagine two basic scenarios in which farmer production would be 
influenced by the availability of insurance premiums (2015). The first scenario is for a farmer 
who is already a purchaser of crop insurance (Figure 2.8) and the second is for a farmer who is 
incentivized to purchase crop insurance because of the subsidies (Figure 2.9). 
 
Figure 2.8. Production under risk: Scenario 1 
 
Source: Author’s own depiction 
Figure 2.9. Production under risk: Scenario 2 
 
Source: Author’s own depiction 
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In scenario 1 the farmer is already purchasing crop insurance. If insurance premiums 
were increased, assuming the farmer maintains the same insurance coverage level, this would be 
reflected as a downward shift of the marginal cost curve, from C`0 to C`1 and an equal shift of the 
supply curve resulting in an increase of output from Q0 to Q1. In scenario 2 assume the increase 
in subsidies is large enough to impact the profitability of a farmer not purchasing crop insurance, 
i.e. beyond the point where the farmer is indifferent to buying crop insurance. This means that 
the impact of increased costs due to the unsubsidized portion of the premium payment, C`0 to 
C`1, is more than offset by the reduction in the farmer’s risk premium, R`0 to R`1, which again 
results in an output increase from Q0 to Q1. In practice it is also possible that both effects can 
occur simultaneously. For example, an increase in subsidies may incentivize a farmer to 
purchase a higher level of coverage, which could simultaneously reduce productions costs and 
risk depending on the size of the subsidy increase. 
To this point this paper has focused on the history of agriculture policy, the crop 
insurance program, and the theories behind how the latter affects production level in order to 
convey the centrality of the program to corn and soybean farmers. At this juncture the paper will 
cover each of the key markets that make up the model used in the research. Allusions will be 
made to the crop insurance program and the impact of subsidies throughout. 
 2.2 Corn 
Corn is the most important crop in the United States in terms of both land allocation and 
crop value (Ash, Livezey, & Dohlman, 2006). In 2014, 90 million acres of corn were planted for 
a value of $52.3 billion (USDA National Agriculture Statistics Service). The majority of corn is 
grown in the North Central United States, with this region producing about 80% of all corn in the 
nation. Iowa and Illinois alone account for about 30% of total national production (Hoffman, 
Baker, Foreman, & Young, 2007).  
Nearly all the corn consumed domestically and exported abroad is used as an industrial 
input and livestock feed (Ibid). The biggest consumer of corn is the US ethanol industry, which 
has historically been supported by government policy. Domestic meat producers also consume a 
significant portion of the corn supply with much of the remainder exported (see Figure 2.10).  
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Figure 2.10. Corn consumption by sector 
 
Adapted from (Conley, Nagesh, & Salame, 2012) 
 
The general trend of corn since the early 1970s has been one of continued increases in 
production during a long period of general price decline (See Figure 2.11). The real price of corn 
decreased 78% from 1974 to 2004, while production increased by 151% during the period. This 
coincides with the shift in agricultural policy toward removing barriers to production and 
increasing farmer support. 
 
Figure 2.11. History of corn production and prices 
 
Adapted from (farmdoc.illinois.edu). 
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With respect to the FCIP, the crop insurance has become increasingly important for corn 
farmer over time due to increased subsidization. Farmers have also been switching coverage 
from yield to revenue insurance while also increasing the level of coverage, with the most 
common level of coverage at 70% (Ibid).  When taking into account that most corn farmers 
rotate with soybean (Ash, Livezey, & Dohlman, 2006), any policy change that affects corn 
farmers also impacts soybean farmers. This in turn can reverberate through the meat commodity 
chains.  
 2.3 Soybean and Soybean Meal 
Soybean is second only to corn in both area planted and total value of production. In 
2014, total acreage amounted to 83,701,000 with a value of $40.2 billion. Like corn, it is 
primarily grown in the Upper Midwest of the United States where conditions are best for 
achieving high yields (Ash, Livezey, & Dohlman, 2006).  
Soybean is not typically used for meat production. It’s relevancy to the livestock industry 
is derived from its co-product, soybean meal. Approximately 90% of the soybean utilized 
domestically is crushed into soybean meal and soybean oil (Masuda & Goldsmith, 2009, p. 5). 
An advantage of soybean meal over other oilseed meals is the high yield relative to oil when 
crushing soybean. Soybean meal consists of 80% of the total soybean (Houck, Ryan, & 
Subotnik, 1972). Virtually all domestic soybean meal is used for livestock feed (See Figure 
2.12). Less than 1% of the global soymeal supply is allocated for other uses than feed (Masuda 
and Goldsmith, 2009).  
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Figure 2.12. Soybean meal consumption by sector 
 
Adapted from (United Soybean Board, 2012) 
 
As with corn we notice a similar trend in production and prices of soybean beginning in 
the early 1970s with respect to prices and supply (See Figure 2.13). The real price of soybean 
decreased by 83% from 1973 to 2001, while production increased by 87% during the same 
period. While this is certainly not enough evidence to the claim that cheap prices and high levels 
of production were caused by subsidies, it does support the argument that the subsidies have 
contributed to this paradigm11. Regardless this is a setting under which livestock producers 
feeding their animals corn and soybean meal were benefiting from reduced costs and increased 
prices of feed. 
                                                 
11 The author reiterates that there are other explanations for this phenomenon, such as technological change, 
increased economies of scale, and changes in consumer preferences.  
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Figure 2.13. History of soybean production and prices 
 
Adapted from (farmdoc.illinois.edu). 
 2.4 The Meat Sector 
Like the corns and soybean markets the US meat sector has been characterized by 
steadily declining prices and increasing production over the past decades (USDA ERS). From 
1970 to 2014 beef, pork, and poultry production increased from about 42 billion pounds to over 
85 billion (Figure 2.14). This period has also experienced intensive consolidation of meat 
industries, especially in the poultry and pork sectors (RTI International, 2007; Starmer & Wise, 
2007). Larger companies operating on smaller volumes but higher margins were better 
positioned to take advantage of what until very recently were feed grains sold below cost of 
production, giving them an advantage over farms producing their feed onsite (Wise, 2005). 
Consolidation allows companies to generate larger economies of scale and more cost-efficient 
operations (Schroeter, Azzam, & Aiken, 1997). Considering that feed is the costliest input in 
production, composing approximately 60%, 60% and 17% of the production costs for poultry, 
pork, and beef, any agriculture policy that influences lower prices of corn and soybean would be 
an implicit subsidy that bigger companies can capture more benefits from (Wise, 2005, p.3; RTI 
International, 2007, p. 1-4). 
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Figure 2.14. History of US meat production 
 
Adapted from (USDA Economic Research Service) 
 
There is now very little competition at the meatpacking and retail levels for beef, poultry 
and pork, which creates oligopsonistic power within the commodity chains (Azzam & Schroeter, 
1995; Azzam & Anderson 1996; Azzam, 1997; RTI International, 2007; Weng 2012). Livestock 
operators are typically limited in who they can sell their animals to, due to geographical, 
contractual, and/or oligopsonistic constraints (Weng, 2012; Azzam & Schroeter, 1995; Azzam 
1996; RTI International, 2007). Therefore price transition across the supply chains of meat 
products is important to examine. Starmer, Witteland, & Wise argue that the prevalence of 
contract farming, which has become dominant in the broiler and hog sectors, enables meat 
packers to impose price decreases more fully on farmers than the latter are able to capture price 
increases from the former (2006). However, Schroeter, Azzam, & Zang found in the beef 
industry that the retail level has stronger negotiating power than the processing level, the latter of 
which exhibits price-taking behavior (2000).  
The rest of this section will cover each of the meat markets individually and in more 
depth. 
 2.4.1 Beef 
This paper follows RTI International’s accounting of the US beef industry (2007). The 
only difference is that this paper considers the weaning and backgrounding phases of cattle 
production to be the same, as they are both predominantly pasture fed in both time periods. The 
cattle are sold either in the spring or fall to feedlots as feeder cattle. These operations are 
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characterized by their high degree of specialization in which closely confined cattle are fed 
energy and protein-rich diets – mostly corn, distiller’s grain and soybean meal – and are sold on 
to slaughterhouses, where the animals are processed into cuts before being sold on to wholesale 
and retail markets. 
The sector is marked by increased concentration in production with larger operations 
becoming more dominant. About 79% of cow-calf farmers have operations of 100 cows or less, 
but operations of 500 cows or more supply 42% of cattle inventories (Ibid, p. 1-8). The feedlot 
sector is even more concentrated, with operations of 1,000 cattle or more making up 2.6% of 
operations but 85% of the market supply (Ellis, 2009, p. 9). Meanwhile, the top 4 beef packers in 
the US slaughter more than 80% of the cattle (RTI International, 2007, p. 1-1112). This 
demonstrates that market concentration increases the farther down the supply chain. 
The history of US beef prices and quantities reflects this paradigm. With the first graph 
(Figure 2.15) we see both the price of the retail weight equivalent of cattle at the farm level along 
with the retail supply of beef over that time. A logged trendline has been added to demonstrate 
the rate of change. The price of retail beef began to sharply decline after 1973, except for a brief 
spike in prices at the turn of the 1980s. From 1973 to 2001 the real price of retail beef declined 
62%, yet from the trendline we can see that beef supply increased, if slightly. The primary 
sources of this drop in prices discussed in the literature were a decline in consumer demand for 
beef (Marsh, 2003), technological change at the farm and slaughterhouse levels (Brester & 
Marsh, 2001), and cost reducing consolidation (RTI International, 2007).  However, the 
significant drop of feed grain prices during this period must have also played an important role, 
not only as a reduction in costs, but as an incentive to consolidate (Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 
2007). 
 
                                                 
12 Note that in the structure of RTI International reports the number before the hyphen represents the chapter, not a 
page number. 
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Figure 2.15. History of US beef supply 
 
Adapted from (USDA ERS). 
 
On a sector by sector level, we can clearly see that the wholesale-retail price margin 
increased while the farm-wholesale margin decreased (Figure 2.16). From 1973 to 2014 the 
former more than doubled from 26% to 63% while the latter diminished from 17% to 11%. This 
follows the finding by Schroeter, Azzam & Zang previously mentioned that retailers appear to 
exert more market power than the meatpackers (2000). 
 
Figure 2.16. History of US beef prices 
 
Adapted from (USDA ERS). 
 2.4.2 Poultry 
The description of the boiler market, which represents the bulk of the overall US poultry 
market, follows Weng (2012) and Starmer, Witteman, & Wise (2006). The industry is vertically 
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integrated in its entirety where large agribusiness firms, “oversee all links in the production 
chain, including breeding and the hatching of chicks, the milling of feed grain, the grow-out 
stage, and the processing and packaging of finished birds" (Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 2006, p. 
12). Production is coordinated between these firms and independent growers via contractual 
arrangements (Weng, 2012). Integration has served the agribusiness firms on multiple levels: (1) 
integration reduced transaction costs within the chain (Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 2006), (2) 
quality control and consistency was better achieved by firms exerting control over the entire 
production process (Henry & Ruanikar, 1960; Bugos, 1992; Paul, 1999; MacDonald et al., 
2004), (3) larger firms are more apt to introduce technological change and growers under 
contract face less risk than otherwise in adopting these changes (Knoeber, 1989; Bugos, 1992; 
Knoeber & Thurman, 1995; Paul, 1999; MacDonald, et al., 2004). Moreover, contractual 
arrangements eliminated spot market risks for growers and volume control problems for 
processors (Paul, 1999; Aho, 1999). The result were incredible efficiency gains in broiler 
production that saw production costs decline 90% from between 1947 and 1999 (Aho, 1999; 
MacDonald et al., 2004), and the broiler sector attained its dominant position in the meat market 
today (Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 2006). 
Feed costs compose 60% of total production costs for broilers, with raw corn and 
soybean making up 78% of that feed cost (Ibid), which means that these two inputs represent 
nearly half the total cost of production. Therefore the subsidies in the preceding decades, which 
enabled farmers to sell their crops below the cost of production, implicitly subsidized poultry 
farmers. Starmer Witteman, & Wise estimates that from 1997 to 2005 the broiler industry saved 
$1.25 billion annually in feed costs due to agriculture policy in that period (2007, pp. 3-4).  
Due to the highly integrated nature of the broiler industry, both in terms of company 
control and contractual relationships between firms and growers, competition in the industry has 
become minimal. The top 4 processing firms concentration ratio in 1997 was 58.52%. While this 
is smaller than for the beef and pork sectors (80% and 68% respectively) (Weng, 2012, p.4), this 
does not take into account the impact the contractual nature of the industry has on farmer 
choices. For one, the proliferation of contractual arrangements has crowded out other venues for 
farmers to sell their livestock (Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 2007). Second is that contract terms 
are usually private, which prevents farmers from being able to compare prices and conditions 
across firms, thereby limiting their bargaining power (Carstensen, 2003). The result is a market 
 25 
 
structure in which processors are able to push downward price trends onto growers (Lee, 1996; 
Morison, 1996), but farmers have difficulty in capturing market price increases (Perry, Baker & 
Green, 1999). 
Unlike for beef and pork, the pricing data found for poultry only goes back to 1980 for 
retail and 1990 for wholesale value, but it is still possible to see the important trends using only 
the data from 1990. Figure 2.17 shows a clear decline in broiler prices while the supply continues 
to increase13. This is what one would expect to see given the information just provided regarding 
the integration and cost cutting of the broiler industry. Of more interest is the history of pricing at 
both the retail and wholesale level of broilers (Figure 2.18). Unlike for beef and pork, the price 
retail-wholesale price margin has actually declined over time14, suggesting that processors 
exhibit more market power than retailers. This is especially pronounced in the last 15 years 
during which the wholesale-retail margin declined from 190% to 126%. 
 
Figure 2.17. History of US broiler supply 
 
Adapted from (USDA ERS). 
 
                                                 
13 For a longer period look at broiler supply please refer back to Figure 1.14. 
14 The trendlines give a negative linear slope of -0.001 for retail prices and -0.0004 for wholesale prices. 
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Figure 2.18. History of US broiler prices 
 
Adapted from (USDA ERS). 
 2.4.3 Pork 
The exposition of the US hog and pork sector follows RTI International (2007) and Trist 
& Wise (2010). While there are three stages in hog production: farrow-to-wean, wean-to-feeder, 
and feeder-to-slaughter, these divisions are not so distinct in reality (RTI, 2007). As such, this 
paper and the corresponding model account for farrow-to-feeder as one stage. Similar to poultry 
feed costs compose about 60% of total production costs (Ibid, p. 1-4). At the farm level much of 
the efficiency improvement has come from improving sow fertility, both in terms of litter size 
and number of litters in a sow lifetime (Ibid, p. 1-8). 
The structure of the hog industry resembles the broiler sector, though it is not nearly as 
integrated because production and marketing contracts are becoming more commonly used 
between processors and farmers. On a growing scale, packers own their hogs and contract with 
producers as a source of labor and infrastructure (RTI International, 2007; Wise & Trist, 2010). 
Meanwhile, there has been significant concentration of the hog and pork sector at both the farm 
and processing level. From 1966 to 2001, while the number of hogs remained consistently at the 
same level, the number of farms reduced from 1 million to just over 80,000, with less than 5,000 
of those farms accounting for more than half the total hog population. The largest operations 
house 16.7 hogs per hectare (Osterbgerg & Wallinga, 2004, p. 1703). Feed savings have likely 
aided in this consolidation, as factory farms who purchase feed below production costs have a 
competitive advantage over operations that grow their own feed, as the latter are not eligible for 
subsidies on crops grown to feed their own livestock (Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 2007). The 
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processing sector is also concentrated with the top 4 firms controlling 68% of the market (Weng, 
2012). 
The historical data closely resembles that of the beef sector (Figures 2.19). A key 
difference is the clear increase in price despite a significant price decline over the time period. 
Again the subsidization of corn and soybean likely played a role in this dynamic, as it 
contributed to reduced feed costs for hog farmers (Starmer, Witteman, & Wise, 2007).  
 
Figure 2.19.  History of US pork supply 
 
Adapted from (USDA ERS). 
 
The pricing history of pork reveals a paradigm which differs from the beef sector (Figure 
2.20). The increasing gap between retail and processing prices is clear. From 1975 to 2014 the 
processing-retail price margin increased from 17% to 114%. This suggests that there is an even 
greater market power differentiation between retail and processing in the pork sector than in 
beef.  Also of note is that what may appear to be a diminishing farmer-wholesale price margin is 
actually misleading. Following a period of decline until the mid-1980s, the price margin began to 
increase again. From 1975 to 1986 the farm-processing price margin dropped from 44.5% to 
21%. From that year on the spread grew erratically, but since 1997 the price margin has never 
dropped below 37.7% with only 4 of those years being below 47%. This may suggest that the 
increased concentration in the packing sector and use of contracts has deteriorated the 
negotiating power of hog farms, even as they grow in size. 
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Figure 2.20. History of US pork prices 
 
Adapted from (USDA ERS). 
 2.5 Ethanol and Distiller’s Grain 
 
When discussing the impact of policy choices on corn on meat markets it is important to 
take the ethanol sector into account. The ethanol industry represents nearly 40% of corn 
disappearance in the United States which is significant competition for feed grain with livestock 
producers (Schnepf, 2013, p. 9). A co-product of the ethanol production process in the dry 
milling process, which constitutes more than 90% of US mills, are distiller’s grains15, which is a 
source of both energy and protein (Hoffman & Baker, 2010). This section will provide an 
overview of both ethanol and the distiller’s grain market. 
Ethanol is an alcohol that is produced during the fermentation and distillation of sugars. 
Corn has a high starch content, which can be easily converted into sugar and then used for 
making ethanol. The dominance of corn as the primary feedstock for US ethanol production has 
been due to its historically cheap price, which is critical for producers, as feedstock costs 
represent more than 50% of total ethanol production costs16 (Schnepf, 2007). 
                                                 
15 Note that there are several types of distiller’s grains with varying properties. This paper will refer to the most 
common form of distiller’s grain, the dried distiller’s grain with solubles (DDGS), or just the general term of 
distiller’s grain (DG). 
16 This figure is taken after co-products like DDGS are sold. 
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The growth of the ethanol industry has been dependent on a history of targeted 
government policies. Production has increased over 600% since the early 2000s (Schnepf & 
Yacobucci, 2013, p. 1). The salient policy in present times is the expanded Renewable Fuels 
Standard (RFS2), which was enacted in the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act. This 
law mandates that as of 2015, fuel blenders must utilize 15 billion gallons of corn ethanol in the 
production of gasoline (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013). One bushel of corn is required to produce 
2.8 gallons of ethanol, so this law essentially mandates the allocation of about 5.35 billion 
bushels of corn to ethanol production, which is a significant amount of inelastic demand for corn. 
Schnepf & Yacobucci discuss the correlation between increasing corn prices and ethanol demand 
since 2005 (2013). However, there is a credit system to the RFS2 mandate, in which blenders 
who utilize more ethanol than required by the quota, receive RIN credits that can be used to help 
meet the quota in the following year. These credits are also eligible to be sold on the open market 
to other blenders yet to meet their quota (Ibid).  It is possible to see the growth of corn 
consumption by the ethanol sector to the detriment of the meat sector and exports in Figure 2.21. 
 
Figure 2.21. Corn consumption by sector17 
 
Adapted from (Schnepf 2013). 
 
                                                 
17 Total values over 100% can be attributed to consumption of stocks. 
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One important aspect to be discussed with regards to potential ethanol consumption is the 
“blend wall.” Ethanol is compatible with gasoline infrastructure so long as it consists of no more 
than 10% of the fuel (E10). Until now, carmakers have refused to offer warranties on cars 
running on fuel with more than 10% ethanol blend. Coupled with infrastructural constraints this 
creates an effective wall which inhibits the growth of further ethanol demand (Schnepf & 
Yacobucci, 2013). It is estimated that the current RFS2 mandate of 15 gallons exceeds the 
current “blend wall” demand (Schnepf, 2013). Without a change of the ethanol blend standard or 
rapid increase in transportation, future growth of the ethanol sector is to be severely limited. 
Even though the ethanol industry represents significant competition with the meat sector 
for corn, it also contributes DDGS as another feedstuff for livestock18.  To a degree this even 
represents a symbiotic relationship, as selling DDGS is “crucial to controlling ethanol production 
costs, as they offset feedstock costs" (Hoffman, Baker, Foreman, & Young, 2007). Due to the 
fixed output relationship between ethanol and DDGS, increased production of the former results 
in an increased supply of the latter (Hoffman & Baker, 2010). However, the substitutability of 
DDGS for corn and soybean is limited by the digestive capacity of livestock, especially 
monogastric animals like pigs and poultry, which have trouble digesting the fiber dense food 
(Hoffman, Baker, Foreman, & Young, 2007). 
 2.6 Externalities of Industrial Meat Production 
The industrialization and intensification of meat production in the United States has not 
been sufficiently regulated to protect human health or the environment. Kanaly et al., claim that 
these large scale feeding operations have produced significant and extensive consequences, for 
which the costs have been externalized (2010). They further argue that externalities from the 
agriculture sector carry four distinct features: “(1) their costs are often neglected, (2) they often 
occur with a time lag, (3) they often damage groups whose interests are not well represented, and 
(4) the identity of the source of the externality is not always known (Pretty et al., 2000; Pretty et 
al. 2003)" (Kanaly et al., 2010, p. 7). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to extensively address the different types of 
externalities and their economic impacts, but a brief overview will be provided. Two specific 
                                                 
18 There is a fixed proportion of ethanol to DDGS production which is 0.18 bushels per gallon. 
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externalities that will be discussed are greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and the negative 
impacts on human health caused by intense animal contact and antibiotic resistant bacteria. 
The primary sources of GHG emissions from the livestock sector is from enteric 
fermentation by ruminants (mainly cattle in the US), and manure and urine excretion (Scollan et 
al., 2010). The US Environmental Protection Agency estimates that 3% of total US GHG 
emissions come from cattle alone and that each feedlot cattle produces approximately 46kg of 
methane a year. With an approximately 13 million feedlot cattle, that amounts to 600 million kg 
of CH4 (2014), a GHG that traps heat 20x more effectively than carbon dioxide (Kanaly, et al., 
2010). Addressing GHG emissions from livestock is key component of limiting the impact of 
climate change (Scollan et al., 2010). 
There is cause to be worried about the human health implications of the large scale 
animal feeding operations. The increased amount and intensity of human contact with livestock 
increases the chances of disease transmission. In fact, the majority of emerging human diseases 
have been sourced by animals (Taylor et al., 2001). Of note are the H1N1 and H5N1 flu viruses, 
with which the first infected humans contracted the diseases from contact with animals (pigs and 
poultry). At the time of this paper's writing there has been significant coverage of the MERS 
virus, which is currently believed to have originated from contact with camels (US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention). 
Not only are humans vulnerable to contracting diseases from animal contact, industrial 
feed practices are also mitigating our ability to combat bacteria with modern antibiotics. Many of 
the antibiotics used on livestock are also applied to humans thereby increasing the chances of 
cross-resistant bacterial strains emerging (Kanaly, et al., 2010). Livestock are given several times 
the amount of antibiotics than are consumed by people in the United States, much of which is 
used to promote animal growth and preemptive treatment of illness, which is necessary given the 
unsanitary and stressful conditions they are exposed to in industrial operations (Osterberg, D., & 
Wallinga, D., 2004). The costs of  a major outbreak of an antibiotic resistant bacterium could be 
staggeringly high. Frenzen, Drake, & Angulo, estimated the annual cost of E-Coli O157 to be 
US$405 million (2005).  
There are also many externalities indirectly associated with industrial meat production. 
The production practices for livestock feed, which frequently consists of intense use of fertilizers 
and pesticides. This can cause problems not only locally, but over long distances as well (Runge, 
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2002). The most extreme example of this is the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico, fed 
primarily by the fertilizers washing downriver from the Midwestern Corn Belt (Osterberg, D., & 
Wallinga, D., 2004). Kanaly et al., argue that reducing crop production for animal feed would be 
one of the most potent measures for mitigating GHG emissions from the agriculture sector 
(2010, p. 8). 
Other studies have attempted to estimate the costs (monetary and otherwise) of 
externalities of industrial meat production, monetarily and otherwise. Sneeringer found that a 
doubling of industrial livestock production in a region increases infant mortality by 7.4% (2009, 
p.124). Daley et al. found in their meta-analysis comparing the health impacts of grass-fed to 
grain-fed beef, that the former is better for human health. Grass fed beef consists of healthier 
fatty acids, contains less harmful cholesterol, increased antioxidant content, and enhances the 
precursors for vitamins A and E (2010). Pretty (2005) estimated the externalities of industrial 
meat production in the UK to be 64.8, 12.8, and 5.7 pence per kg of beef, pork, and poultry. 
Nguyen, Hermansen & Mogensen estimate the environmental costs of industrial pig production 
to be 1.9 Euro per kg. It is clear that the costs of industrial meat production is not being fully 
captured by producers, and that it may be desirable to implement policies that make them 
internalize more of these externalities.  
To summarize this chapter, the author has attempted to convey the interdependence of the 
US feed grains, livestock, and ethanol sectors and the role of agriculture policy within this 
dynamic. This paper has attempted to illustrate how changes in agriculture policy coincided with 
steep declines of soybean and corn prices while their supplies continued to grow, a phenomenon 
that would prove beneficial for large scale livestock producers contributing to social and 
environmental costs not paid for by these operations. 
The author has also attempted to provide a basic framework for understanding how 
insurance rate premium subsidies can affect the supply of corn and soybean. By both reducing 
costs and risks of production, microeconomic theory suggests that farmers are incentivized to 
expand their production given an increase in these subsidies. Taken in reverse, a reduction in 
subsidies should result in a decrease in corn and soybean supply, causing increased costs for 
meat producers, which in turn would reduce meat supplies. Therefore, decreasing insurance 
premium subsidies for corn and soybean may be a useful policy measure to limit the externalities 
caused by industrial meat production.  
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Chapter 3 - Literature Review 
While it can be useful to analyze a multimarket model using a flow chart, such as from 
Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, they do not, “imply causality in the determination of the endogenous 
variables of the model. In general, all equations are simultaneous and the model must 
consequently be solved jointly for all the endogenous variables" (Sadoulet & de Janvry, Chapter 
11, pp. 6-7). It is with this in mind that Chapter 3 covers the relevant literature for this paper. The 
first part will provide a brief introduction to the equilibrium displacement model. The second 
section discusses the theory and development of the (S)EDM framework. The third section of the 
will discuss prior research of special relevance to this paper. The overall intent of this chapter to 
communicate the utility of equilibrium displacement models to answer the question driving this 
paper. 
 3.1 Introduction to Equilibrium Displacement Models 
The EDM framework began with Muth (1964) who wanted to develop a framework for 
analyzing an industry with vertically related markets. Muth demonstrated the framework for a 
single commodity 2-factor model, with both inputs having their own supply and demand 
functions. Gardner’s work (1975) expanded on Muth’s model to analyze how exogenous shocks 
on demand, supply, and input demand of food affected the farm-retail price spread. Halloway 
(1991) then undertook an analysis using Gardner’s general framework to test for oligopolistic 
power. 
EDMs have most frequently been used to analyze the price, quantity and welfare impacts 
of policy scenarios (Sumner & Wohlgenant, 1985; Ambarwati et al., 2006; Brester, Marsh, & 
Atwood, 2006; Dhoubhadel, Azzam, & Stockton, 2015; Lusk, 2015). Another area of study has 
been the impacts of research and development or marketing (Mullen, Alson, & Wohlgenant, 
1989; Lemiuex & Wohlgenant, 1990; Halloway, 1991; Wohlgenant, 1993;; Zhao et al., 2000). 
More recently EDMs have been used to analyze the impact of climactic shocks on agriculture 
(Fathelrahman, Davies, Davies, & Pritchett, 2014; Dhoubhadel, Azzam, & Stockton, 2015). 
A previous EDM that examined the interdependence of the grain, oilseeds, livestock, and 
ethanol markets are those of Bhattacharya, Azzam, and Mark (2009). Specifically, this paper 
investigates how the impact of a demand shock from the ethanol sector reverberates through the 
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other markets. The increased demand for corn caused an increase in the price of the crop. This 
led to a decrease in demand for corn by the livestock sector, which responded by more of other 
feed crops. The movement from corn consumption by the livestock sector was reinforced by the 
increased production of distiller’s grain from the ethanol sector. This was especially important 
for the beef and dairy industries because of the cow’s better ability to digest DG. 
While the results from this study are valuable because the directional changes of prices 
and quantities are similar to those expected by this paper, it is not possible to directly relate the 
study by Bhattacharya, Azzam, and Mark to this paper. The shock they employed is an indirect 
increase in corn demand via more ethanol production rather than a direct negative supply for the 
crop (as well as soybeans).  
 3.2 Stochastic Equilibrium Displacement Models 
The description of equilibrium displacement models follows that of Piggot (1992), Zhao 
et al., (1997), and Wohlgenant (2011). An EDM is a system of equations in logarithmic 
differential form which enables comparative static analysis from the movement of the initial 
equilibriums given a shock to one or more parameters in the system (Wohlgenant, 2011). In 
other words, it is a system of equations that have been totally differentiated and expressed in 
elasticities (Bhattacharya, Azzam, & Mark, 2009). What this means is that following a 
percentage shock to one or more parameters in the system (i.e. insurance premium subsidies), the 
percentage changes of price and quantities are calculated for the system of equations to reach a 
new equilibrium. An important aspect of an EDM is that it makes no assumptions about the 
functional form of the supply and demand equations, as the relative price and quantity changes 
are estimated using linear elasticities as parameters (Piggot, 1992). 
 
As an example, assume a single market model for corn: 
Supply of corn: Qs = S(P,Z)        (1) 
Demand for corn: Qd = D(P)          (2) 
Market equilibrium: Qs = Qd   (3) 
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where P is the price of corn and Z represents a vector of exogenous shocks on the supply 
of corn, which in this case is only the insurance premium subsidy. We then express this system 
of equations in log differential form: 
 
Supply of corn: EQs = εs*EP + εs,z*EZ (4) 
Demand for corn: EQd = ηd*EP     (5) 
Market equilibrium: EQs = EQd           6) 
 
where εs and ηd are the own price supply and demand elasticities for corn, εs,z is the 
supply elasticity of corn with respect to the insurance premium subsidy, and E represents 
percentage changes of the variables. In this simple model EZ, a percentage change in the 
subsidy, would be shocked and the three equations would be simultaneously solved, giving EQ 
and EP, or the percentage change in the equilibrium price and quantity of corn.  
There are multiple advantages to using the EDM. First the model parameters are 
elasticities, market shares, and cost shares, for which many of these values can be taken from 
prior research, saving researchers the time and resources necessary to recalculate these 
parameters (Piggot, 1993; Bhattacharya, Azzam, and Mark, 2009; Wohlgenant, 2011). Another 
advantage is an EDM can be easily replicated and expanded upon by other researchers unlike 
complex econometric models, which are often not readily shared (Bhattacharya, Azzam, and 
Mark, 2009). 
One aspect to consider is that when the functional form of the supply and demand 
equations is non-linear then the approximations are prone to errors. According to Zhao et al., if 
one assumes convexity in the demand curve and concavity in the supply curve around the 
equilibrium points then the estimated values for EP will always be overestimated when EP < 0 
and underestimated when EP > 0. However, no conclusions can be made with respect to the 
direction of errors in approximating EQ (1997, p.1246). However, when the exogenous shocks 
are small, so are the approximation errors (Alston and Wohlgenant, 1990), which enables the 
researcher to focus on the policy implications of the model rather than functional form 
(Wohlgenant, 2011). 
 A significant problem associated with EDMs is that the values chosen by the research for 
the elasticities and shares are assumed to be precise (Davis and Espinoza, 1998). A typical way 
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of overcoming this problem has been conducting a simple sensitivity analysis by providing a 
table with alternative parameter values and the different EP and EQ resulting from them. The 
authors highlight several issues with such an approach: (1) given different sets of parameters 
there is ambiguity regarding the true values of EP and EQ. (2) Even though having a set of 
values may be more informative than a single point, no information is provided regarding central 
tendencies. (3) It is impossible to determine the statistical significance of the results. (4) Any 
results are at the discretion of the parameters chosen by the researcher, so there is a concern for 
researcher bias (p. 870). 
The authors propose simulating the model with a distribution applied around the priori 
parameters chosen. Using sampling techniques posterior distributions of EP and EQ can be 
generated, which then allow the researcher to utilize the central tendencies and dispersion to 
generate the confidence intervals and p-values to test various hypotheses regarding EP and EQ 
(Ibid). One difficulty this paper has had in following this framework is with respect to the fourth 
issue brought up by Davis and Espinoza regarding researcher bias in the chosen parameter values 
due to a general lack of available elasticities. Instead of using multiple values for given 
elasticities, when available, the research chose the elasticities that would cause the most 
significant difference from the initial hypothesis19. For example, if multiple values were 
available for the elasticity of retail beef supply, the one that would cause a bigger change in 
equilibrium quantity and price was chosen. This is because the research is based on the 
assumption that insurance premium subsidies affect the feed markets, yet to the author’s 
knowledge there has been no prior econometric estimation of the elasticities for these subsidies 
on soybean and corn production. The elasticities used were therefore calibrated by the author and 
thus likely influenced by the researcher’s own biases. However, the reader should recall that the 
working hypothesis is that the impact of these subsidies is not enough to significantly influence 
the meat markets. Therefore, if the hypothesis is confirmed using elasticities more likely to 
disprove it, the findings should have more validity. 
Chebyshev inequalities are constructed at a given confidence level to produce confidence 
intervals for the mean EP and EQ values obtained in the simulation. As discussed by Davis and 
Espinoza: 
                                                 
19 The exceptions are the supply elasticities for corn and soybean, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chebyshev's inequality is in general form prob(L ≤  C ≤ U) ≥ 1 - 1/k2, where the lower 
bound is L = ?̅?𝑥 - kψ, the upper bound is U = ?̅?𝑥  + kψ,  ?̅?𝑥  is the mean of the observations 
on any variable x,ψ is the standard deviation of the variable x, k is a constant scaling 
variable for the standard deviation, and C is a hypothesized value of x. (1998, p. 875) 
We then solve for k at a specified confidence interval, w, where 1 - 1/k2 = w. The value for k is 
then plugged in to the equations for U and L to generate the w confidence interval for the 
estimated mean values. To find the max p-values for the hypothesized value of C, we find k so 
that ?̅?𝑥 ± kψ = C, where the operator sign is + if ?̅?𝑥 is negative – when otherwise. We then solve for 
the max p-value = 1/k2 (Ibid). However, when C =0, so that the null hypothesis is H0: x = 0 this 
process simplifies so that the max p-value = 1/(?̅?𝑥 / ψ)2. With the p-value it is possible to 
determine the statistical significance of the results. In conclusion the SEDM provides more 
detailed results than the basic EDM. 
 3.3 Supply Side EDM Studies of the Relevant Markets 
Previous research this paper gives special attention to are those of Lusk (2015) and 
Dhoubhadel, Azzam & Stockton (2015). The former used an EDM to analyze the impact of 
eliminating insurance premium subsidies on the welfare of producers and consumers, while the 
latter analyzed the impact of a drought on the US grain, oilseed, and livestock markets. The 
model used in this paper is also based on this research. 
To the knowledge of this author, Lusk is the first to quantify the market impact of 
insurance premium subsidies. Lusk implemented an EDM to analyze the welfare impacts of three 
policy scenarios on different sectors of the agro-food economy. The one discussed by this paper 
is the elimination of the entire insurance premium subsidy program. The model links 9 retail 
goods with 24 vertically integrated and interrelated inputs. For example, corn can be used as an 
input to produce cereals or fed to livestock, which are then an input for producing meat.  
What is especially interesting regarding Lusk’s work is his approach to estimating the 
supply impact of eliminating insurance premium subsidies, in which the supply shock is assumed 
to be the ratio of the total subsidy to the commodity’s total cost (p. 35). As a percentage shock, 
the total removal of insurance premium subsidies amounts to 5.553% and 5.11% reduction for 
corn and soybean supplies. The model used in this paper incorporates a different approach for 
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calculating the elasticity of the insurance premium subsidy, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 Unfortunately, Lusk did not provide the equilibrium changes resulting from the shock, 
rather focusing on welfare changes. However, the author does state that corn prices increased by 
4.75%. A key finding is that every group in the model other than tax payers benefit from the 
subsidies, which would suggest why the subsidies persist despite an overall net benefit from 
removing them (p.45).  
The research in this paper differs from Lusk in several important ways: (1) By 
eliminating the entire program the impact on corn and soybean would be mitigated, as farmers 
are incentivized to switch to other crops still eligible for insurance premiums. (2) Lusk’s model 
allows for more crop substitution (7 in total) including wheat and barley. This paper only 
includes corn, DDGS, and soybean meal, which are the bulk of inputs used as animal feed. (3) 
The results in Lusk’s research are focused on welfare impacts, whereas this paper is concerned 
with price and quantity changes. 
As stated previously, the model used in this research is based on the prior work by 
Dhoubhadel, Azzam, and Stockton (2015). The authors wanted to evaluate the impact of an RFS 
mandate waiver and RIN credits on the grain, oilseed, and livestock markets in the event of a 
drought. While the model and key differences between their model and this paper’s will be 
presented in the next chapter, their results with respect to the impact of a drought disallowing for 
the RIN credit program will be presented here. The reason for analyzing the non-baseline 
scenario is that, as the authors found in their results, allowing for RIN credits makes ethanol 
demand more elastic, which in turn causes less movement from the original equilibrium for the 
corn market. Again, this paper has attempted to choose scenarios that are most likely to 
contradict the stated hypothesis in the first chapter; that reducing subsidies will have a minimal 
effect on meat markets. 
The authors found that a drought causes a 2.9% and 1.9% reduction of corn and soybean 
quantities and corresponding 8.8% and 5.1% increase in prices. The impact on soybean meal was 
even more pronounced with a -5.5% and 7.4% change in quantity and price. Contrary to what 
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one may expect, the price of DDGS decreased by 1.6%20. While quantities of the poultry and 
hog industries were barely affected with small price increases, the beef industry was severely 
affected by the drought. Quantities decreased by 10.4%, 9.1%, 6.8%, and 3.1% and prices 
increased 5.4%, 3.4%, 6.3%, and 4.9% from the farm to retail levels. However, it should be 
noted that in their model, the supply of cattle at the farm level is affected by a drought due to 
reduced availability of pasture, which would explain the farm level experiencing the biggest 
shock of the 4 levels of the beef chain. 
The intent of this chapter was to convey the utility of using an equilibrium displacement 
model to answer this paper’s research question of how insurance premium subsidies for corn and 
soybean impact livestock markets in the United States. The EDM enables the researcher to 
simultaneous solve all the equations for the important submarkets in the grain, oilseed, livestock, 
and ethanol sectors given an exogenous percentage shock allows for qualitative and quantitative 
analysis (Bhattacharya, Azzam, and Mark, 2009).  
  
                                                 
20 It should be noted that the authors estimated a negative elasticity for corn demand from the livestock sector with 
respect to the price of DDGS, but had a positive elasticity in the reverse relationship. This was due to the fact that 
DDGS can be used as both a protein and energy source as well as data constraints when estimating the elasticities 
(Dhoubhadel, 2015). However, it likely explains what may seem an counter-intuitive price movement for DDGS. 
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Chapter 4 - Model Specifications 
This chapter discusses the model used by the paper. The first section provides an 
overview of the structural model including the market sectors, supply and demand equations, and 
key assumptions of the model. The second section will discuss the EDM, how the elasticities 
were chosen and calibrated, and the key differences from the model implemented by 
Dhoubhadel, Azzam, & Stockton. 
 4.1 The Structural Model 
Following Dhoubhadel, Azzam, & Stockton (2015, pp. 83-84), the structural model 
consists of three submodels: (1) the meat sector consisting of beef, pork, and poultry, (2) the 
grains and oilseed sector consisting of corn, soybean, soybean meal, and distiller’s grains, and 
(3) the ethanol market21. Retail meat demand consists of supermarket and consumption out of the 
home (i.e. restaurants). Demand for each segment of the supply chain upstream from retail is the 
conditional demand from the downstream level. For example, the demand for feeder cattle at the 
farm level is the derived demand from feedlots. The model assumes fixed proportional input 
relationships between nonmaterial inputs and raw material inputs. The nonmaterial inputs are 
assumed to be perfectly elastic, and therefore are not included in any of the supply or demand 
equations. Livestock producers are able to substitute between corn, soybean meal, and DDGS at 
the feedlot level for cattle, farm level for hogs, and processing level for poultry. The only 
exogenous shifters considered in the model, denoted by Zi, are the reductions to insurance 
premium subsidies for corn and soybean. A list of variable definitions can be found in Table 1.  
                                                 
21 Each market was discussed in depth in the first chapter of this paper. 
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Table 4.1. Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑏𝑏 Quantity of corn for cattle producers 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝 Quantity of corn for hog producers 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑜𝑜 Quantity of corn for poultry producers 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑒𝑒 Quantity of corn for ethanol producers 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑥𝑥 Quantity of corn for export 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐 Quantity of total corn 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 Quantity of soybean for domestic market 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑥𝑥  Quantity of soybean for export 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 Quantity of total soybean 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑏𝑏  Quantity of soybean meal for cattle producers 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑝  Quantity of soybean meal for pork producers 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑜𝑜  Quantity of soybean meal for poultry producers 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑥𝑥  Quantity of soybean meal for export 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 Quantity of total soybean meal 
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑏𝑏  Quantity of DG for cattle producers 
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝  Quantity of DG for pork producers 
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑜𝑜  Quantity of DG for poultry producers 
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑥𝑥  Quantity of DG for export 
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 Quantity of total DG 
𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 Quantity of ethanol 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟 Quantity of beef at retail level 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣 Quantity of beef at processing level 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙  Quantity of slaughter cattle at feedlot level 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓 Quantity of feeder cattle at farm level 
𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟 Quantity of pork at retail level 
𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣 Quantity of pork at processing level 
𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓 Quantity of slaughter hogs at farm level 
𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟 Quantity of poultry at retail level 
𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣 Quantity of poultry at processing level 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 Price of corn 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 Price of soybean 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 Price of soybean meal 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 Price of DG 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 Price of ethanol 
𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟 Price of beef at retail level 
𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣 Price of beef at processing level 
𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙  Price of slaughter cattle at feedlot level 
𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓 Price of feeder cattle at farm level 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟 Price of pork at retail level 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣 Price of pork at processing level 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓 Price of slaughter hogs at farm level 
𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟 Price of poultry at retail level 
𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣 Price of poultry at processing level 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶  Insurance premium subsidy for corn 
𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 Insurance premium subsidy for soybean 
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 4.1.1 Corn 
The structural model for corn consists of the downstream derived demand from the 
livestock and ethanol producers and export demand. The total demand for corn is given as the 
sum of these derived demand equations. Corn supply is given as a function of its own price, the 
price of soybean, and the insurance premium subsidy. 
 
Derived demand for corn from cattle: 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 =  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐1(𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠, 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)                   (1) 
Derived demand for corn from poultry: 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 =  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐3(𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣, 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)                   (2) 
Derived demand for corn from hog: 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝 =  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐2(𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)             (3) 
Derived demand for corn from ethanol: 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 =  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐4(𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒)          (4) 
Export demand for corn: 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥 =  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐5(𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐)          (5) 
Total demand for corn: 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 =  𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 + 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 + 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 + 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥        (6) 
Corn supply: 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐6(𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 ,𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐)             (7) 
 
 4.1.2 Soybean and Soybean Meal 
The demand for soybean is composed of both domestic and export demand. The supply 
of soybean, like corn, is a function of its own price, the price of corn, and the insurance premium 
subsidy.  
Domestic demand for soybean: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 =  𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏1 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 ,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)                      (8) 
Export demand for soybean: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑥𝑥 = 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏2 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏)            (9) 
Total demand for soybean: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑 =  𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 + 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜 + 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑥𝑥        (10) 
Soybean supply: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏3 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 ,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏)             (11) 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the majority of soybean is crushed into soybean oil and 
soybean meal, the latter of which is used almost exclusively for livestock feed. The derived 
demand for soybean meal consists of the livestock and export markets. The total demand for 
soybean meal is the sum of these 4 equations. The supply of soybean meal is a function of its 
own price and the quantity supplied of soybeans. 
 
Derived demand for soybean meal from cattle: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 =  𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)               (12) 
Derived demand for soybean meal from poultry: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜  =  𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠3 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)           (13) 
Derived demand for soybean meal from hog: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑝 =  𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)                (14) 
Export demand for soybean meal: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 =  𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠4 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)            (15) 
Total demand for soybean meal: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 =  𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 + 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥        (16) 
Soybean meal supply: 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠5 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏)                (17) 
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 4.1.34 Distiller’s Grains 
Following the demand for soybean meal, the derived demand for DDGS consists of the 
demand from the livestock and export sectors. The total demand for DDGS is the sum of these 
derived demands. The supply of DG is fixed in proportion to the quantity of corn used to produce 
ethanol. 
 
Derived demand for DG from cattle: 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 =  𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ,𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 , 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)              (18) 
Derived demand for DG from poultry: 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜 =  𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷3 (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ,𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)               (19) 
Derived demand for DG from hog: 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝 =  𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷2 (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ,𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)              (20) 
Export demand for DG: 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥 =  𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷4 (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)                  (21) 
Total demand for DG: 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 =  𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 + 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 + 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜 + 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥        (22) 
DG supply: 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 =  0.18𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒                   (23) 
 
 4.1.4 Ethanol 
Ethanol demand from blenders is assumed to be inelastic due to the RFS2 mandate and is 
represented by equation (24). The supply of ethanol by distillers is given by equation (25). 
 
Derived demand for ethanol from fuel blenders: 𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒1(𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒)22          (24) 
Ethanol Supply: 𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒2(𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 ,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐)     (25) 
 
 4.1.5 Beef 
The beef marketing chain is composed of 4 submarkets from farm to retail, each with its 
own supply and demand derived from either the adjacent downstream or upstream level. As 
discussed by Dhoubhadel, Azzam, & Stockton (p. 84), the supplies are a function of material-
input quantities rather than prices due to data availability for quantity transmission elasticities 
provided by RTI International (2007). 
 
                                                 
22 This is the given function for ethanol demand after the RFS2 mandate has been met. The current level of the 
mandate is above the demand for ethanol signified by the “blend wall,” as discussed previously. Hence, at the 
current mandate ethanol demand is totally inelastic when RIN credits are not available. 
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Retail: 
 
 Final demand for beef: 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏1�𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 ,𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 ,𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟�       (26) 
Retail supply of beef: 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏2(𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 ,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣)             (27) 
 
Processing: 
 
Derived demand for beef from retail: 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏3(𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟)       (28) 
Meatpacker supply of beef: 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏4(𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 )       (29) 
 
Feedlot: 
 
Derived demand for fed cattle from meatpackers: 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏5�𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 ,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣�                          (30) 
Supply of fed cattle: 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏6(𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)      (31) 
 
Feeder cattle: 
 
Derived demand for feeder cattle from feedlots: 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏7�𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓 ,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 �       (32) 
Supply of feeder cattle: 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏8(𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓)             (33) 
 
 4.1.6 Poultry 
As discussed in chapter 1, poultry supply is fully integrated between the farm and 
processing level. Therefore this model consists of only the processing and retail supply and 
demand equations. 
 
Retail: 
 
 Final demand for poultry: 𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜1�𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 ,𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 ,𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟�       (34) 
Retail supply of poultry: 𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜2(𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 ,𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣)             (35) 
 
Processing: 
 
Derived demand for poultry from retail: 𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜3(𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣,𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟)                     (36) 
Meatpacker supply of poultry: 𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝4(𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)       (37) 
 
 4.1.7 Pork 
The pork sector is more integrated than the beef marketing chain, but not as completely 
as the poultry industry. Therefore there are 3 segments to the pork marketing chain from farm to 
retail.  
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Retail: 
Final demand for pork: 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝1�𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 ,𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 ,𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟�           (38) 
Retail supply of pork: 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝2(𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 ,𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣)                 (39) 
 
Processors: 
 
Derived demand for pork from retail: 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝3�𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣,𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟�       (40) 
Meatpacker supply of pork: 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝4(𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣,𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓)       (41) 
 
Farm: 
 
Derived demand for slaughter hogs from meatpackers: 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 =  𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝5�𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣�                          (42) 
Supply of slaughter hogs: 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 =  𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝6(𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)          (43) 
 
 4.2 The Stochastic Equilibrium Displacement Model 
As discussed in the previous chapter, total differentiation of the structural model and 
putting the equations in differential logarithmic form provide a system of equations representing 
percentage changes of the variables. For example, the equations for soybean and corn supply, the 
two equations in the system that are directly shocked by the exogenous variables, are as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖       (44) 
 
where the subscript i represents the crop for which the supply function is specified (corn 
or soybean) and j denotes the other crop. 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 is the percentage change in quantity supplied. 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 signifies the own price elasticity of supply multiplied by the percentage change in price 
of crop i, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 expresses the cross price elasticity of supply multiplied by the percentage 
change in the price of the other good, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 is the supply elasticity of the crop with 
respect to insurance premium subsidy multiplied by the percentage change in subsidy. 
Except for the supply of corn and soybean, which are set equal to the value of the 
negative shock from a reduction in insurance premium subsidies, all equations are set equal to 0. 
The model can then be solved using matrix algebra. Let X be the vector (43x1) of percentage 
change of the endogenous variables, B the vector of exogenous shocks to the system (43x1), and 
A the (43x43) matrix of model parameters, consisting of elasticities and quantity shares. The 
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system can then be written as AX = B. The percentage changes of the endogenous variables 
given the exogenous shock can then be solved for as X = A-1B. 
Following Davis & Espinoza (1998), a stochastic framework is implemented so that 
statistical confidence intervals and max-P values can be generated. This was accomplished by 
applying a priori normal distribution around the elasticity estimates used in the model. However, 
standard deviations were not available for most of the elasticity values. Therefore, this paper 
followed Dhoubhadel, Azzam, & Stockton (2015) by obtaining a critical t-value to estimate 
standard errors. Since t-values are the quotient of an estimated value by its standard deviation, by 
taking a critical t-value at a given confidence interval with a specified degree of freedom, the 
standard deviation can be extrapolated. As in the original research, this paper chose to take the t-
value at df = 3 with a one-sided confidence interval of 0.005 in order to obtain a t-value of 
5.84123. After calculating the standard deviations for the elasticity estimates minimum and 
maximum values were applied to the distributions to ensure consistent signs of the values (i.e. so 
that supply elasticities remains positive). 
The model is solved in Microsoft Excel using the SIMETAR add-in to run 1,000 
iterations the simulation (Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman, 2008). A 90% Chebyshev 
confidence interval is calculated at the simulated mean values for the endogenous variables along 
with their maximum p-values, which allows for the determination of the level at which the 
results are statistically significant. 
 4.3 Key Differences from Dhoubhadel Azzam, & Stockton and Other Notes 
The first and obvious difference was the introduction of the elasticity for corn and 
soybean supply with respect to insurance premium subsidies. This paper took a different 
approach from Lusk (2015) after conferring with Jisang Yu, a PhD student at UC Davis who is 
researching the impact of insurance premium subsidies, and Scott Gerlt, who is responsible for 
the crop supply portion of the FAPRI model. Yu recommended using the own price elasticity of 
supply as a starting point, whereas Gerlt informed the author that the FAPRI model assumes the 
                                                 
23 This paper had originally intended to use the t-value at the confidence interval of 0.025 (3.182) to account for the 
fact that only one value was used for each elasticity, thereby allowing for a larger distribution of values. However, in 
this scenario all estimated values in the simulation were found to be insignificant, so the original t-value from 
Dhoubhadel, Azzam, and Stockton was used.  
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supply elasticity with respect to insurance premium subsidies to be 75% of the supply elasticity  
with respect to the net returns of each crop. Taking the value of these supply elasticities form 
FAPRI’s database the supply elasticities for corn and soybean with respect to insurance premium 
subsidies was found to be about 0.16 and 0.18, respectively (FAPRI). This paper decided to take 
0.7 of the own price elasticities for the two crops, which gave elasticities of .20 for corn and .18 
for soybean. This will be especially important when discussing the elasticities chosen for corn 
and soybean at the end of this section. 
The second difference was to use long-run elasticities for the parameter values. The clear 
difference in shocks between the two papers is that a drought has short-run impacts24, while on 
the other hand, larger supply elasticities are more likely to represent the long-run implications of 
policy change (Lusk 2015). When long-run elasticities were not found in the literature for supply 
and input demand elasticities, they were calibrated based on the ratio between short-run and 
long-run elasticities at the level where animals were fed grains and oilseeds25. For example, the 
short-run elasticity in the literature for hog supply at farm level was 0.41 and it was 1.8 for the 
long-run (Lemieux & Wohlgenant, 1989). This ratio of 4.4 was then multiplied to the short-run 
elasticity value of the supply of hogs with respect to the price of soybean meal.  
There were two motivations for following this procedure. The first was to obtain what is 
hoped to be realistic long-run elasticities by keeping ratio for all supply and input demand 
elasticities constant for the same good. The second was that some of the long-run elasticities in 
the literature seemed too high to be realistic. For example, in their EDM model quantifying the 
impact of country-of-origin labeling, Brester , Marsh, & Atwood (2004) used a short-run 
elasticity for poultry supply at retail level of 0.18, but the long-run elasticity was 13.1, which is 
about 70 times larger. It seems unrealistic that an 8% increase in the price of poultry would result 
in a more than doubling of poultry supply26. 
The final change to the model was introduction of cross price elasticities of supply for 
corn and soybean. This is not necessary since planting is likely to occur before prior to farmers 
having knowledge of the drought, after which it is too late to change crop allocation. However, 
                                                 
24 This is assuming actors believe the drought is idiosyncratic and not a new norm. 
25 The author applied this technique at the recommendation of the thesis adviser, Yves Surry at the Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences, in Uppsala, Sweden. 
26 Details regarding this and other calibrations made to the elasticities can be found in the Appendix-A. 
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agriculture policy changes have long-run implications, giving farmers time to make decisions 
based off policy and price changes. Therefore cross-price elasticities are important for this 
model, especially considering that most corn farmers already rotate with soybean. 
The last point to be discussed is the selection of the long-run elasticities for soybean and 
corn. This paper used the long-run elasticities presented by Hendricks, Smith and Sumner 
(2014), which many would be likely to consider quite low (.29 for corn and .26 for soybean). In 
fact, their long-run elasticities were smaller than the short-run elasticities, contradicting a major 
tenet of microeconomics that production flexibility increases the longer the time horizon. 
However, the authors argue that rotational considerations for corn and soybean farmers impose 
restrictions on the farmer that are stronger in the long-run than in the short-run. While a farmer 
may choose to plant corn-on-corn in back to back years depending on price signals, doing so 
repeatedly will eventually reduce the productivity of the crop due to diminished nutrients in the 
soil and increased prevalence of pests (Ibid, p. 1). Therefore, crop rotation is more constraining 
on production in the long-run than in the short-run.  
Regardless, this paper is aware of the potential controversy using these elasticities may 
have, so in Appendix-B the reader can find non-stochastic simulation results where the long-run 
corn and soybean elasticities provided by Harrington and Dubman (2008) from the USDA 
Economic Research Service. Their long-run elasticities for corn and soybean were 1.246 and 
1.402, respectively. Moreover, the elasticities of premium subsidies maintained the same 
formula, so that they were .87 for corn and .98 for soybean. However, while there was a stronger 
impact on the grain and oilseed markets, the effect on the livestock markets were not divergent 
enough to cause any deviation from the conclusions of this paper. 
 
Chapter 5 - Results 
The results obtained were from a simultaneous 10% reduction in insurance premium 
subsidies for both corn and soybean. This in turn can be computed as a %2 and 1.8% shock to 
corn and soybean supply respectively. The results can be viewed from Tables 5.1-3, and all 
values are in percentages. As a reminder, the lower and upper bound values represent the 90% 
Chebyshev confidence intervals. This is the interval within which a least 90% of the estimated 
values in the 1,000 iterations fall between. 
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Table 5.1. Grain, Oilseed, and Ethanol Market Impact 
Market Change Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Max p-
value 
Corn Quantity**a -1.36 0.16 -1.87 -0.86 0.014 
Price** 3.92 0.49 2.38 5.47 0.016 
Soybean Quantity** -2.54 0.33 -3.59 -1.50 0.017 
Price** 2.19 0.45 0.77 3.61 0.042 
Soybean Meal Quantity** -2.02 0.29 -2.93 -1.12 0.020 
Price** 3.76 0.66 1.66 5.85 0.031 
Distiller's Grain Quantity* 0 0 0 0 0 
Price** 1.70 0.32 0.68 2.71 0.036 
Ethanol Quantity* 0 0 0 0 0 
Price** 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.049 
a *, **, *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Table 5.1 shows that the quantities of corn, soybean and soybean meal decreased by, 
1.36% [-1.87, 0.86], -2.54% [-3.59, -1.5], and -2.02% [2.93, -1.12], while their prices increased 
by 3.92% [2.38, 5.47], 2.19% [0.77, 3.61], and 3.76% [1.66, 5.85] following the reduction of 
insurance premium subsidies. The quantity of ethanol and distiller’s grain remain unchanged 
because of the RFS2 mandate.27 The prices of the two products increased by 1.7% [0.68, 2.71] 
for DG and 0.08% [0.2, 0.13] for ethanol.  
The price change for corn is relatively much greater in this paper than Lusk, whose model 
predicted a 4.75% increase following the elimination of the entire crop insurance program, which 
included a shock to corn and soybean supplies more than double the value in this paper. 
However, Lusk allowed for more substitutability for feed crops by livestock producers which 
would put less price pressure on corn following a supply shock, so the results are not directly 
comparable. 
Overall the results reflect the expectations of the author given the framework from 
Chapter 1. Following a reduction in insurance premium subsidies farmers would decrease the 
supply of corn and soybean, which in turn would decrease the supply of soybean meal. Since 
feed is still demanded by livestock producers as well as corn from ethanol distiller’s the 
                                                 
27 The reader should keep in mind that the model did not allow for RIN trading to meet the RFS2 quotas, which 
would allow for a short term reduction in ethanol production. 
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reduction in supply results in price increases. The impact on the price of DG is likely the least 
because: (1) there was no change in supply instead of a reduction in available quantity, (2) the 
ability for livestock producers to substitute corn and soybean meal for DG is constrained by the 
dietary restrictions for livestock animals.  
 
Table 5.2. Meat and Livestock Market Impact 
Market Change Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Max p-
value 
Beef Retail quantity 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.06 1.000 
Retail price 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.168 
Processing quantity -0.07 0.04 -0.22 0.07 0.371 
Processing price 0.14 0.05 -0.03 0.31 0.147 
Feedlot quantity*a -0.22 0.07 -0.44 0.00 0.099 
Feedlot price* 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.40 0.067 
Farm quantity -0.10 0.04 -0.23 0.03 0.186 
Farm price -0.13 0.05 -0.29 0.04 0.167 
Poultry Retail quantity -0.14 0.05 -0.29 0.02 0.134 
Retail price 0.51 0.17 -0.03 1.06 0.112 
Processing quantity* -0.21 0.05 -0.36 -0.06 0.053 
Processing price* 0.35 0.15 -0.14 0.83 0.197 
Pork Retail quantity -0.03 0.03 -0.13 0.07 0.962 
Retail price 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.19 0.253 
Processing quantity -0.28 0.13 -0.68 0.12 0.205 
Processing price 0.35 0.13 -0.08 0.77 0.148 
Farm quantity* -0.98 0.27 -1.83 -0.12 0.076 
Farm price* 1.38 0.32 0.36 2.39 0.054 
a ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
The results from Table 5-2 confirm the hypothesis of this paper, that decreasing the 
insurance premium subsidies for corn and soybean are unlikely to have major effects on the 
livestock and meat markets. For the beef market chain no quantity outside the feedlot level, for 
either quantity or price, changed by more than 0.1%, and none of those values were found to be 
statistically significant. The retail sector experienced no change at all. The only two values of 
statistical significance were for the feedlot level, which is logical considering it is the level 
directly affected by the changes in feed prices and quantities. The price and quantity of slaughter 
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cattle changed by 0.22% [0.04, 0.4] and -0.22% [-0.44, 0.00]. Also of note is that the price and 
quantity of feeder cattle both decreased, following the expectations of the author. 
The impact on the poultry market was slightly more than that of the beef market. The 
price and quantity change at the retail level was 0.51% [-0.03, 1.06] and -0.14% [-0.29, 0.02]. 
These values were nearly significant at the 10% level, especially the price of poultry at retail, and 
these price and quantity changes are also quite small. The effect on the processors, the level of 
poultry production directly impacted by feed prices, were statistically significant with changes in 
price and quantity of 0.35% [-0.14, 0.85] and -0.21% [-0.06, -0.36], which again are 
inconsequential with respect to addressing the externality concerns of livestock production. 
The hog market was the most affected by the subsidy reduction. Once again, the only 
level that had statistically significant changes was at the farm level, which is directly impacted 
by feed prices. While none of the changes at the retail and processing level were above 0.35%, 
the price and quantity changes for slaughter hogs is 1.38% [0.36, 2.39] and -0.98% [-1.83, -.012]. 
While this demonstrates a direct linkage between insurance premium subsidies and the slaughter 
hogs market, it also suggests that reducing subsidies to corn and soybean would not result in 
substantial decreases from the externalities of hog production.  
Of particular interest is that the magnitude of percentage changes in price from 
farm/processing to retail occurred in the opposite direction of what would be anticipated given 
the previous discussion of market power the in the different meat commodity chains. One would 
expect the percentage change in price to increase from farm to retail for beef and pork, and to 
decrease from processing to retail. The explanation would be that the model itself does not 
directly take market power into account, hence there are no price wedges imposed between 
different levels of the commodity chain28. Moreover, taking the nature of the EDM into account, 
having implemented a positive supply shock of the same value would have returned the same 
results with opposite signs. In this case the price changes would have reflected the expectations 
given market power in the commodity chains. This author believes this highlights the difficulty 
in using EDMs to analyze market power. 
                                                 
28 The author would have liked to insert price wedges into the model, but was unable to due to time and resource 
constraints. 
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The lack of a major impact on the meat markets can likely be attributed to two important 
factors. The first is the increased flexibility in the production decisions firms face in the long-run 
as opposed to the short-run, which is reflected in their higher elasticity values. Specifically in 
this case, it means that firms are more responsive to input-price increases by substituting for 
cheaper inputs. The second issue is that even though feed composes a high portion of livestock 
production costs, especially for hog and poultry, the change in feed prices represents at the very 
most 2% increase in total costs. However, this result is important given that prior research has 
suggested that industrial livestock producers could be sensitive to even small changes in feed 
costs because they operate on small profit margins (Wise, 2005). 
  
Table 5.3. Impact on Feed and Oilseed demand by Sector 
Market Change Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Max p-
value 
Corn  Beef -0.83 0.90 -3.66 2.01 1.00 
Pork -2.08 0.96 -5.11 0.95 0.21 
Poultry -0.60 0.40 -1.88 0.67 0.45 
Ethanol*a -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.09 
Exports** -6.37 1.00 -9.52 -3.21 0.02 
Soybean Meal  Beef -1.79 0.90 -4.64 1.05 0.25 
Pork 0.30 0.45 -1.13 1.72 1.00 
Poultry -0.43 0.27 -1.30 0.44 0.40 
Exports** -7.68 1.17 -11.38 -3.98 0.02 
Distiller's Grain  Beef 1.58 0.61 -0.35 3.51 0.15 
Pork 3.42 1.82 -2.33 9.17 0.28 
Poultry 1.20 0.64 -0.82 3.22 0.28 
Exports** -4.98 1.13 -8.54 -1.41 0.05 
Soybean  Domestic 0.13 0.27 -0.71 0.97 1.00 
Exports** -3.09 0.41 -4.40 -1.79 0.02 
a *, **, *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Table 5-3 shows the change in demand for feedstock and oilseed from each sector. While 
most of the values are statistically insignificant, they do give us some indication of how each 
sector is responding to the supply changes of feed. Exports were the most affected for all 
commodities, and the results were also statistically significant. The change in demand by each 
sector was -6.37% [-9.52, -3.21], -7.68% [-11.38, -3.98], -4.98% [-8.54, -1.41] and -3.09% [-
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4.40, -1.79] for corn, soybean meal, DG, and soybean respectively. The biggest changes occur at 
the export level because export demand is more elastic than domestic demand. As for the 
livestock sector, demand for corn from all sectors decreased, with pork consumption declining 
the most. This is an expected response given the reduced supply of corn. In response to the 
decreased corn consumption all three increased in their use of DG, again with hog consumption 
of DG experiencing the biggest change. What is curious is that consumption of soybean meal by 
the hog sector increased despite the downward supply shift. The best explanation offered by this 
paper is that the long-run elasticity values used for hog farmers were larger than for other 
commodities, rather than some kind of market dynamics being at work, so in this model hog 
producers have more flexibility in feed choices than in the broiler and cattle sectors. As 
discussed previously long-run input demand elasticities were extrapolated from short-run 
elasticities in the literature and then multiplied by the ratio between the own price elasticity of 
supply at the short and long-runs. From those elasticities hog farmers had the largest ratio, so in 
turn the input and cross price input demand elasticities would be larger than for cattle and poultry 
farmers.  
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Chapter 6 - Discussion 
This paper used a modified form of the stochastic equilibrium displacement model 
implemented by Dhoubhadel, Azzam, and Stockton (2015) to estimate the impact a reduction of 
insurance premium subsidies for corn and soybean would have on the US grain, oilseed, feed, 
livestock, and ethanol markets. Specifically, this model links corn, soybean meal, and distiller’s 
grains, the coproduct of ethanol production, with the beef, poultry, and pork markets. The author 
also attempted to demonstrate the effect insurance premium subsidies have on the production 
decisions of crop farmers through a combination of decreased costs and risks.  
The motivation of this research was to limit the costly externalities of industrial livestock 
production, especially from the environmental and human health standpoint, not to mention the 
fiscal burden on taxpayers. The results of the model reveal that while the subsidies have a 
substantial impact on the feed market itself, this shock does not deeply penetrate the meat 
markets.  Corn and soybean meal prices increase the most due to the reduction in subsidies. The 
pork sector is most affected by these price changes, whereas the beef marketing chain was 
virtually unchanged, yet the biggest change in the meat sector was just a  1.38% increase in the 
farm price of hogs. 
The salient limitation of this research is the lack of previous research having quantified 
the impact of the insurance premium subsidies on production, so a calibrated value is used. 
Depending on difference between the true value of the elasticities and those used in this paper, 
the results could have different policy implications. However, given the results from Appendix 
B, in which the paper used non-stochastic model with much higher own price supply elasticities, 
this authors finds it unlikely that different conclusions would be reached with different values for 
the supply elasticities with respect to premium subsidies. Furthermore it should be pointed out 
that this model did not include other feed crops like barley or wheat. Doing so would allow for 
more substitutability by livestock producers, likely dampening the effects on the meat markets 
even further. 
Another issue worth examining deeper is the prevalence of market power in each meat 
commodity chain, and the role that subsidies have possibly had in producing this paradigm. 
Further research could look closely at how market power would alter the results obtained by this 
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study by imposing price margins between the different stages of the commodity change and 
examining welfare changes. 
Regardless it appears that if society desires a decrease in industrial meat production then 
other means must be pursued that better internalize the externalities of current systems. While 
eliminating insurance premium subsidies may be desirable from the taxpayer perspective, it is 
not a plausible solution to the problem addressed by this paper. As noted earlier, the best areas to 
pursue are likely modernizing the regulatory framework of meat production so that producers are 
more accountable for the environmental degradation, and health impacts their production 
systems are contributing to. 
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Appendix A – Logarithmic Differential Equations of the Model 
Here the reader can find the structural model from Chapter 4 in logarithmic differential 
form. The parameter values chosen and their sources can be found in the table in the following 
section. As a note to the reader, η represents demand elasticities, ε supply elasticities, and γ 
quantity elasticities. 
Corn: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑏𝑏 −  𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙,𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 − 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (1) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑜𝑜 −  𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣,𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣 − 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0  (2) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝 −  𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓,𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 − 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (3) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑒𝑒 − 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐
𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐
𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒 = 0 (4) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑐𝑐
𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 = 0 (5) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑑𝑑 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑏𝑏 − 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏
𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏
𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑒𝑒 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏
𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑥𝑥 = 0 (6) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 = 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐 (7) 
 
Soybeans: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 0 (8) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 = 0 (9) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑑𝑑 − 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑥𝑥 = 0 (10) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 − 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 = 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 (11) 
 
Soybean meal: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑏𝑏 −  𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙,𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (12) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑜𝑜 −  𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣,𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (13) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑝 −  𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓,𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (14) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 0 (15) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑏𝑏 − 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑥𝑥 = 0 (16) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 = 0 (17) 
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Distiller’s Grain: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑏𝑏 −  𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝛾𝛾𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙,𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 − 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 0 (18) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑜𝑜 −  𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝛾𝛾𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣,𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣 − 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 0 (19) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝 −  𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝛾𝛾𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓,𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 − 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 0 (20) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (21) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑑𝑑 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑏𝑏 − 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑥𝑥 = 0 (22) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑠𝑠 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐
𝑒𝑒 = 0 (23) 
 
Ethanol: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒
𝑑𝑑 = 0 (24) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒
𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 − 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 = 0 (25) 
 
 
Beef: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟 − 𝜂𝜂𝑏𝑏,𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 − 𝜂𝜂𝑏𝑏,𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 = 0 (26) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟 − 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟,𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣 = 0 (27) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣 − 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣,𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 = 0 (28) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣 − 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
𝑣𝑣,𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 = 0 (29) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙 − 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙,𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑣 = 0 (30) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙 − 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
𝑙𝑙,𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓 − 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (31) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓 − 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓,𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 = 0 (32) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑓 = 0 (33) 
 
 
Poultry: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟 − 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 − 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜,𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 = 0 (34) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟 − 𝛾𝛾𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟,𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣 = 0 (35) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣 − 𝛾𝛾𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣,𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0 (36) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜
𝑣𝑣 − 𝜀𝜀𝑜𝑜
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜀𝜀𝑜𝑜
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑜𝑜
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (37) 
 
 
Pork: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟 − 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 − 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝,𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0 (38) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟 − 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟,𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 = 0 (39) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣 − 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣,𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 = 0 (40) 
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣 − 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣,𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 = 0 (41) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 − 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓 − 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓,𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 = 0 (42) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓 − 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (43) 
 
 Parameter Values 
Here the reader can find the parameter values used in the logarithmic differential model. 
The long-run elasticity calibration (denoted by a, b, c, and d in the “Source” column is explained 
after the table. 
 
Table A.1. Model parameter values 
Para- 
meter 
Definition Value Source 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜
𝐛𝐛 Elasticity of corn demand by beef sector w.r.t price of corn -0.66 Dhoubhdadel, 201529a 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜
𝐨𝐨 Elasticity of corn demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of corn -0.61 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜
𝐩𝐩 Elasticity of corn demand by hog sector w.r.t price of corn -0.30 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜,𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛  Cross elasticity of corn demand by beef sector w.r.t price of soymeal 1.00 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜,𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐨  Cross elasticity of corn demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of soymeal 0.42 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜,𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐩𝐩  Cross elasticity of corn demand by hog sector w.r.t price of soymeal 1.05 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜,𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐛𝐛  Cross elasticity of corn demand by beef sector w.r.t price of DG -1.07 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜,𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐨𝐨  Cross elasticity of corn demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of DG -0.46 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜,𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐩𝐩  Cross elasticity of corn demand by hog sector w.r.t price of DG -1.58 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛄𝛄𝐜𝐜
𝐥𝐥,𝐛𝐛 Elasticity of corn demand by beef sector w.r.t. quantity of cattle at 
feedlot level 
1 Unit cost function 
(UCF)30 
𝛄𝛄𝐜𝐜
𝐯𝐯,𝐨𝐨 Elasticity of corn demand by poultry sector w.r.t. quantity of poultry 1 UCF 
𝛄𝛄𝐜𝐜
𝐟𝐟,𝐩𝐩 Elasticity of corn demand by pork sector w.r.t. quantity of hogs 1 UCF 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜
𝐞𝐞 Elasticity of corn demand by ethanol sector w.r.t price of corn -0.02 Luchansky & Monks, 
200931 
                                                 
29 For space consideration Dhoubhadel, Azzam, and Stockton( 2015) will be referred to as Dhoubhadel, 2015. 
30 As argued by Dhoubhadel, Azzam, and Stockton, “total differentiation of a demand function derived by assuming a 
unit cost function and using shepherd’s lemma results into expression similar to equation 19 with elasticity of demand with 
respect to downstream quantity equal to 1 (2015, p3). 
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Para- 
meter 
Definition Value Source 
𝛈𝛈𝐜𝐜
𝐱𝐱 Elasticity of export demand for corn -1.64 Remier, 2012 
𝜸𝜸𝒄𝒄
𝒆𝒆 Elasticity of corn demand by ethanol sector w.r.t. quantity of ethanol 1 UCF 
𝛆𝛆𝐜𝐜 Own price elasticity of corn supply 0.29 Hendricks, et al., 
2014 
𝛆𝛆𝐜𝐜
𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛 Cross price elasticity of corn supply w.r.t. price of soybean -0.22 Hendricks, et al., 
2014 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛 Own price elasticity of soybean demand -0.37 Gerlt, 2013 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛
𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬 Cross price elasticity of soybean demand w.r.t. soymeal demand 0.25 Gerlt, 2013 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛
𝐱𝐱  Elasticity of export demand for soybean -1.45 Remier et al., 2012 
𝛆𝛆𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛 Own price elasticity of soybean supply 0.26 Hendricks, et al., 
2014 
𝛆𝛆𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛
𝐜𝐜  Cross price elasticity of soybean supply w.r.t. price of soymeal -0.33 Hendricks, et al., 
2014 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬
𝐛𝐛  Elasticity of soymeal demand by beef sector w.r.t price of soymeal -1.11 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬
𝐨𝐨  Elasticity of soymeal demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of soymeal -0.32 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬
𝐩𝐩  Elasticity of soymeal demand by hog sector w.r.t price of soymeal -0.22 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬,𝐜𝐜𝐛𝐛  Cross elasticity of soymeal demand by beef sector w.r.t price of corn 0.52 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬,𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐨  Cross elasticity of soymeal demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of corn 0.20 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬,𝐜𝐜𝐩𝐩  Cross elasticity of soymeal demand by hog sector w.r.t price of corn 0.44 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬,𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐛𝐛  Cross elasticity of soymeal demand by beef sector w.r.t price of DG 0.31 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬,𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐨𝐨  Cross elasticity of soymeal demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of DG 0.10 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬,𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐩𝐩  Cross elasticity of soymeal demand by hog sector w.r.t price of DG 0.22 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛄𝛄𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬
𝐥𝐥,𝐛𝐛  Elasticity of soymeal demand by beef sector w.r.t. quantity of cattle at 
feedlot level 
1 UCF 
𝛄𝛄𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬
𝐯𝐯,𝐨𝐨  Elasticity of soymeal demand by poultry sector w.r.t. quantity of poultry 1 UCF 
𝛄𝛄𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬
𝐟𝐟,𝐩𝐩  Elasticity of soymeal demand by pork sector w.r.t. quantity of hogs 1 UCF 
𝛈𝛈𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬
𝐱𝐱  Export elasticity of soymeal 2.08 Piggot, 2001d (same 
as ratio for corn) 
𝛆𝛆𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬 Own price elasticity of soymeal supply 0.14 Piggot, 2001 
𝛄𝛄𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬
𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛  Supply elasticity of soymeal w.r.t. quantity of soybean 1 Dhoubhdadel, 2015 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 This value was found to be insignificant, but this value seems more likely than the significant value found by 
Luchansky and Monks of 0.13. 
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Para- 
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Definition Value Source 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃
𝐛𝐛  Elasticity of DG demand by beef sector w.r.t price of DG -2.73 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃
𝐨𝐨  Elasticity of DG demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of DG -1.11 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃
𝐩𝐩  Elasticity of DG demand by hog sector w.r.t price of DG -3.51 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃,𝐜𝐜𝐛𝐛  Cross elasticity of DG demand by beef sector w.r.t price of corn 0.83 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃,𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐨  Cross elasticity of DG demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of corn 0.29 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃,𝐜𝐜𝐩𝐩  Cross elasticity of DG demand by hog sector w.r.t price of corn 1.01 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃,𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐛𝐛  Cross elasticity of DG demand by beef sector w.r.t price of soymeal 0.83 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃,𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐨  Cross elasticity of DG demand by poultry sector w.r.t price of soymeal 0.56 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃,𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐩𝐩  Cross elasticity of DG demand by hog sector w.r.t price of soymeal 1.67 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝛄𝛄𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃
𝐥𝐥,𝐛𝐛  Elasticity of DG demand by beef sector w.r.t. quantity of cattle at 
feedlot level 
1 UCF 
𝛄𝛄𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃
𝐯𝐯,𝐨𝐨  Elasticity of DG demand by poultry sector w.r.t. quantity of poultry 1 UCF 
𝛄𝛄𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃
𝐟𝐟,𝐩𝐩  Elasticity of DG demand by pork sector w.r.t. quantity of hogs 1 UCF 
𝛈𝛈𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃
𝐱𝐱  Export elasticity of DG -2.95 Dhoubhdadel, 2015d 
𝜼𝜼𝒆𝒆 Own price elasticity of ethanol supply 0.65 Elobeid & Tokgoz, 
2008 
𝛈𝛈𝐛𝐛
𝐫𝐫  Own price elasticity of beef demand at the retail level -0.70 Brester, 1996 
𝛈𝛈𝐛𝐛,𝐨𝐨𝐫𝐫  Cross elasticity of beef demand w.r.t. price of poultry at retail level 0.05 Brester, 1996 
𝛈𝛈𝐛𝐛,𝐩𝐩𝐫𝐫  Cross elasticity of beef demand w.r.t. price of pork at retail level 0.19 Brester, 1996 
𝛈𝛈𝐛𝐛
𝐯𝐯  Own price elasticity of beef demand at processing level -0.57 Marsh, 1992 
𝛈𝛈𝐛𝐛
𝐥𝐥  Own price elasticity of fed cattle demand at feedlot level -0.66 Marsh, 1992 
𝛈𝛈𝐛𝐛
𝐟𝐟  Own price elasticity of feeder cattle demand at farm level -0.62 Marsh, 1992 
𝛆𝛆𝐛𝐛
𝐫𝐫  Own price elasticity of beef supply at retail level 1.25 Brester, et al., 2004a 
𝛆𝛆𝐛𝐛
𝐯𝐯  Own price elasticity of beef supply at processing level 0.97 Brester, et al., 2004a 
𝛆𝛆𝐛𝐛
𝐥𝐥  Own price elasticity of fed cattle supply at feedlot level 0.90 Buhr & Kim, 1997 
𝛆𝛆𝐛𝐛
𝐜𝐜  Elasticity of fed cattle supply w.r.t. price of corn -0.07 Meyers et al., 1992a 
𝛆𝛆𝐛𝐛
𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬 Elasticity of fed cattle supply w.r.t. price of soymeal -0.01 Meyers et al., 1992a 
𝛆𝛆𝐛𝐛
𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃 Elasticity of fed cattle supply w.r.t. price of DG -0.007 Dhoubhdadel, 2015a 
𝛆𝛆𝐛𝐛
𝐟𝐟  Own price elasticity of feeder cattle supply at farm level 0.76 Marsh, 2003a 
𝛄𝛄𝐛𝐛
𝐫𝐫,𝐯𝐯 Elasticity of retail beef quantity w.r.t. quantity at processing level 0.71 RTI International, 
2007 
𝛄𝛄𝐛𝐛
𝐯𝐯,𝐫𝐫 Elasticity of processed beef quantity w.r.t. quantity at retail level 1.03 Brester, et al., 2004 
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𝛄𝛄𝐛𝐛
𝐯𝐯,𝐥𝐥 Elasticity of processed beef quantity w.r.t. quantity at feedlot level 0.93 RTI International, 
2007 
𝛄𝛄𝐛𝐛
𝐥𝐥,𝐯𝐯 Elasticity of fed cattle quantity at feedlot level w.r.t. quantity at 
processing level 
1.02 Brester, et al., 2004 
𝛄𝛄𝐛𝐛
𝐥𝐥,𝐟𝐟 Elasticity of fed cattle quantity at feedlot level w.r.t. quantity at farm 
level 
0.94 RTI International, 
2007 
𝛄𝛄𝐛𝐛
𝐟𝐟,𝐥𝐥 Elasticity of feeder cattle quantity at farm level w.r.t. quantity at feedlot 
level 
0.78 Brester, et al., 2004 
𝛈𝛈𝐨𝐨
𝐫𝐫  Own price elasticity of poultry demand at the retail level -0.29 Brester, 1996 
𝛈𝛈𝐨𝐨,𝐛𝐛𝐫𝐫  Cross elasticity of poultry demand w.r.t. price of beef at retail level 0.18 Brester, 1996 
𝛈𝛈𝐨𝐨,𝐩𝐩𝐫𝐫  Cross elasticity of poultry demand w.r.t. price of pork at retail level 0.04 Brester, 1996 
𝛈𝛈𝐨𝐨
𝐯𝐯  Own price elasticity of poultry demand at processing level -0.22 Brester, et al., 2004 
𝛆𝛆𝐨𝐨
𝐫𝐫  Own price elasticity of poultry supply at retail level 0.13 Pothidee & Allen, 
1999 
𝜺𝜺𝒐𝒐
𝒗𝒗 Own price elasticity of poultry supply at processing level 0.2 Brester, et al., 2004b 
𝜺𝜺𝒐𝒐
𝒄𝒄  Elasticity of poultry supply w.r.t. price of corn -0.03 Heien, 1976b 
𝜺𝜺𝒐𝒐
𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 Elasticity of poultry supply w.r.t. price of soymeal -0.04 Meyers, et al., 1992b 
𝜺𝜺𝒐𝒐
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 Elasticity of poultry supply w.r.t. price of DG -0.001 Dhoubhdadel, 2015b 
𝜸𝜸𝒐𝒐
𝒓𝒓,𝒗𝒗 Elasticity of retail poultry quantity w.r.t. quantity at processing level 0.95 Dhoubhdadel, 2015 
𝜸𝜸𝒐𝒐
𝒗𝒗,𝒓𝒓 Elasticity of processed poultry quantity w.r.t. quantity at retail level 1.01 Brester, et al., 2004 
𝜼𝜼𝒑𝒑
𝒓𝒓  Own price elasticity of pork demand at the retail level -0.79 Brester, 1996 
𝜼𝜼𝒑𝒑,𝒃𝒃𝒓𝒓  Cross elasticity of pork demand w.r.t. price of beef at retail level 0.34 Brester, 1996 
𝜼𝜼𝒑𝒑,𝒐𝒐𝒓𝒓  Cross elasticity of pork demand w.r.t. price of poultry at retail level 0.02 Brester, 1996 
𝜼𝜼𝒑𝒑
𝒗𝒗 Own price elasticity of pork demand at processing level -0.71 Brester, et al., 2004 
𝜼𝜼𝒑𝒑
𝒇𝒇  Own price elasticity of hog demand at farm level -0.51 Wohlgenant, 1989 
𝜺𝜺𝒑𝒑
𝒓𝒓  Own price elasticity of pork supply at retail level 3.20 Brester, et al., 2004c 
𝜺𝜺𝒑𝒑
𝒗𝒗 Own price elasticity of pork supply at processing level 1.94 Brester, et al., 2004c 
𝜺𝜺𝒑𝒑
𝒇𝒇  Own price elasticity of hog supply at farm level 1.80 Lemiuex and 
Wohlgenant, 1989 
𝜺𝜺𝒑𝒑
𝒄𝒄  Elasticity of hog supply w.r.t. price of corn -0.40 Stoddart, 1991c 
𝜺𝜺𝒑𝒑
𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 Elasticity of hog supply w.r.t. price of soymeal -0.13 Dhoubhadel, 2015c 
𝜺𝜺𝒑𝒑
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 Elasticity of hog supply w.r.t. price of DG -0.009 Dhoubhdadel, 2015c 
𝜸𝜸𝒑𝒑
𝒓𝒓,𝒗𝒗 Elasticity of retail pork quantity w.r.t. quantity at processing level 0.95 Dhoubhdadel, 2015 
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𝜸𝜸𝒑𝒑
𝒗𝒗,𝒓𝒓 Elasticity of processed pork quantity w.r.t. quantity at retail level 1.01 Brester, et al., 2004 
𝜸𝜸𝒑𝒑
𝒗𝒗,𝒇𝒇 Elasticity of processed pork quantity w.r.t. quantity at hog level 0.95 Dhoubhdadel, 2015 
𝜸𝜸𝒑𝒑
𝒇𝒇,𝒗𝒗 Elasticity of hog quantity at farm level w.r.t. quantity at processing level 1.00 Brester, et al., 2004 
𝑺𝑺𝒃𝒃
𝒄𝒄  Share of corn consumption by beef sector 0.11 Conley, et al., 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒐𝒐
𝒄𝒄  Share of corn consumption by poultry sector 0.13 Conley, et al., 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒑𝒑
𝒄𝒄  Share of corn consumption by pork sector 0.11 Conley, et al., 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒆𝒆
𝒄𝒄  Share of corn consumption by ethanol sector 0.35 Conley, et al., 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙
𝒄𝒄  Share of corn consumption by export sector 0.15 Conley, et al., 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒃𝒃
𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 Share of soymeal consumption by beef sector 0.09 United Soybean 
Board (USB), 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒐𝒐
𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 Share of soymeal consumption by poultry sector 0.35 USB, 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒑𝒑
𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 Share of soymeal consumption by pork sector 0.19 USB, 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙
𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 Share of soymeal consumption by export sector 0.23 USB, 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒃𝒃
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 Share of DG consumption by beef sector 0.56 Hoffman & Baker, 
2011 
𝑺𝑺𝒐𝒐
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 Share of DG consumption by poultry sector 0.07 Hoffman & Baker, 
2011 
𝑺𝑺𝒑𝒑
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 Share of DG consumption by pork sector 0.10 Hoffman & Baker, 
2011 
𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 Share of DG consumption by export sector 0.27 Hoffman & Baker, 
2011 
𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒅𝒐𝒐
𝒔𝒔𝒃𝒃  Share of total soybean consumption in USA 0.17 USB, 2012 
𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙
𝒔𝒔𝒃𝒃 Share of total soybean consumption by export sector 0.83 USB, 2012 
𝜺𝜺𝒄𝒄
𝒛𝒛 Elasticity of corn supply w.r.t. insurance premium subsidy 0.18 Author’s own 
estimation 
𝜺𝜺𝒔𝒔𝒃𝒃
𝒛𝒛  Elasticity of soybean supply w.r.t. insurance premium subsidy 0.20 Author’s own 
estimation 
 
The calibrated long-run elasticities denoted by superscript, a, are those relevant to the 
supply of beef. The short-run elasticities were taken from the literature in the table above, and 
then extrapolated to long-run elasticities based on the short-run/long-run elasticity ratio provided 
by Buhr & Kim (1997), which equates to 3.46. The same is done for the poultry sector, denoted 
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by “b”, using the short-run/long-run elasticity ratio given by Pothidee & Allen (1990), which 
equals 1.44. The ratio for the pork sector was taken from Lemiuex and Wohlgenant (1989), and 
is valued at 4.4. Finally, the long-run export demand elasticities for soybean meal and distiller’s 
grain were calibrated using the short-run/long-run ratio provided by Remier, Zeng, and Gehlhar 
(2012).  
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Appendix B – Simulation with Larger Supply Elasticity Values 
In this part of the appendix the reader can find non-stochastic results for a simulation 
using the supply elasticities from Harrington and Dubman (2008) for corn and soybean supply 
(values of 1.246 and 1.401, respectively) instead of those from Hendricks, Smith and Sumner 
(2014) (0.29 and 0.26, respectively). 
 
Table B.1. Results with larger supply elasticities – Feed and ethanol 
Market Change Value 
Corn 
Quantity -2.16 
Price 6.87 
Soybean 
Quantity -5.04 
Price 4.23 
Soybean Meal 
Quantity -4.02 
Price 7.33 
Distiller's Grain 
Quantity 0.00 
Price 3.11 
Ethanol 
Quantity 0.00 
Price 0.19 
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Table B.2. Results with larger supply elasticities – Feed and oilseed demand by sector 
Market Change Value 
Beef 
Q* at retail 0.01 
P* at retail 0.08 
Q* at processing -0.13 
P* at processing 0.24 
Q* at slaughter -0.38 
P* at slaughter 0.38 
Q* at farm -0.16 
P* at farm -0.22 
Pork 
Q* at retail -0.02 
P* at retail 0.08 
Q* at processing -0.27 
P* at processing 0.36 
Q* at farm -1.03 
P* at farm 1.49 
Poultry 
Q* at retail -0.25 
P* at retail 0.92 
Q* at processing -0.39 
P* at processing 0.65 
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Table B.3. Results with larger supply elasticities – Feed demand by sector 
Market Change Value 
Corn Demand 
Beef -0.89 
Pork -2.46 
Poultry -0.84 
Ethanol -0.05 
Exports -11.24 
Soybean Meal 
Demand 
Beef -3.96 
Pork 1.06 
Poultry -1.01 
Exports -15.24 
Distiller's Grain 
Demand 
Beef 2.87 
Pork 6.84 
Poultry 2.12 
Exports -9.21 
Soybean Demand 
Domestic 0.27 
Exports -6.13 
 
As can be seen from the tables above, even though there is a much higher impact on the 
feed markets in terms of quantity and prices, but there is very little change in the livestock sector. 
Therefore, the conclusions from the paper are not invalidated when using higher elasticity values 
or the long-run supply of corn and soybean. 
